Cited by

-86 (Minn. 2016); d 520, 523 n.4 (Minn. 2013)

Compare, , with Gilbert, d at 487 -89.

See, -86 (Minn. 2016) (holding that appellant forfeited an argument by failing to raise it in his petition for postconviction relief).

We begin with “a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable.”

Under Knaffla, “if a postconviction claim was raised, known, or should have been known when a direct appeal was filed, that claim is procedurally barred and will not be considered in a later petition for postconviction relief.”

“Under the Knaffla rule, if a postconviction claim was raised, known, or should have been known when a direct appeal was filed, that claim is procedurally barred and will not be considered in a later petition for postconviction relief.”

A petition for postconviction relief may be summarily denied “if the petition, the files, and the records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Griffin v. State , Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd.

response to Gilbert’s postconviction petition, the state unequivocally asserted that Gilbert’s claim was “barred under State v. Knaffla.” “Under the Knaffla rule, if a postconviction claim was raised, known, or should have been known when a direct appeal was filed, that claim is procedurally barred and will not be considered in a later petition for postconviction relief.” d 282, 286 (Minn. 2016).

(stating that a claim is Knaffla barred if it should have been known at the time of direct appeal).

See Griffin v. State , –88 (Mi nn.

“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable.” (quotation omitted).

“We review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of f act for clear error.”

See Griffin v. State , (“An attorney’s failure to m ake an objection that would have been properly denied is not objectively unreasonable under the Strickland test.”).

Griffin v. State , , 285 n.1 (Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. Schmidt , , 876 (Minn. 2000) ) (brackets in original); State v. Johnson , 273 Minn. 394 , , 521-22 (1966).

” 286 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).3 Under the second exception, “a viable claim must have substantive merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.

Griffin v. State , (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 1 04 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

“A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” (quotation omitted).

“[A]pplication of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, [so the] standard of review is de novo.”

“A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” (quotations omitted).