Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282.

39 citing documents.

  • In re the Matter of: Minn. Ct. App. 2025
    d 282, 290 (Minn. 1992) (concluding that district courts, when deciding upon custody for children as part of issuing an OFP, need not make particularized findings regarding a child’s best-interests under separate state statute).
  • A24-0752 Minn. Ct. App. 2024
    Indeed, “[c]ompliance with the [statutory] requirements for particularized ‘best interests’ findings is not required when making temporary custody determinations under the Domestic Abuse Act.” 4 -83 (Minn. 1992) ; see Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd.
  • A23-0893 Minn. Ct. App. 2024
    “It is a substantive statute which is complete in itself, carefully drafted to provide limited types of relief to persons at risk of further abuse by other ‘family or household 6 members,’ whether married or not.” 2 “Nothing within the plain wording of the statute suggests that reference to any other statute is necessary.” Id.
  • Kristen M. Egan, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
  • In the Matter of: Holly Elizabeth Often, o/b/o Minor Children, petitioner, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
    Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has distinguished Chapter 518B from Chapter 518, –86 (Minn. 1992), Dornquast presents a significant issue of statutory interpretation without providing any analysis of the statutory language at issue.
  • State of Minnesota, Minn. 2020
    (noting that the Domestic Abuse Act “may be thought of as a ‘band -aid,’ designed to curtail the harm one household member may be doing to the other in the short term”).
  • In re the Marriage of: Beth Ann Bersaw, petitioner, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
    “The requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Baker v. Baker
  • In the Matter of: Tracy Elizabeth Thompson and o/b/o Minor Child, Minn. 2018
    (“[ The Domestic Abuse Act] requires a demonstration of physical harm, or fear, or sexual misconduct .
  • Rew ex rel. T.C.B. v. Bergstrom 845 N.W.2d 764 Minn. 2014
  • Rew ex rel. T.C.B. v. Bergstrom 845 N.W.2d 764 Minn. 2014
    Safety, -17 (Minn.2007) (holding that the “state has a compelling interest” in protecting “the citizens of Minnesota” from individuals who “pose a severe threat to the[ir] health and safety” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); (observing that the State has a “strong interest in preventing violence in a domestic setting”).
  • Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons 818 N.W.2d 523 Minn. 2012
  • Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons 818 N.W.2d 523 Minn. 2012
    Our court has already indicated in broad terms that the Act was designed to protect victims — “[It] was enacted in 1979 as one way to protect victims of domestic as *527 sault.” (noting that the Act was “designed to curtail the harm one household member may be doing to the other”); 213 (Minn.2001) (explaining the purpose of the Act is “to provide speedy, effective relief to victims of domestic abuse” and that the Act “pr
  • Rew v. Bergstrom 812 N.W.2d 832 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
  • Rew v. Bergstrom 812 N.W.2d 832 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
    Governmental Interest The Minnesota Supreme Court has declared that the state has a “strong interest in preventing violence in a domestic setting.”
  • Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons 795 N.W.2d 625 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
  • Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons 795 N.W.2d 625 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
  • Zentz v. Graber 760 N.W.2d 1 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
  • Zentz v. Graber 760 N.W.2d 1 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
    (stating that the “main factors to consider are: (1) the private interests to be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of these interests and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the government interests involved”).
  • Beardsley v. Garcia 753 N.W.2d 735 Minn. 2008
  • Beardsley v. Garcia 731 N.W.2d 843 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
  • Beardsley v. Garcia 731 N.W.2d 843 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
    Section 518B.01 “neither establishes nor terminates a legal relationship.” superseded by statute as stated in Burkstrand, d at 212.
  • Gada v. Dedefo 684 N.W.2d 512 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
  • Gada v. Dedefo 684 N.W.2d 512 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    Relying on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s -88 (Minn.1992), Gada argues that best-interests findings were not required.
  • Burkstrand v. Burkstrand 632 N.W.2d 206 Minn. 2001
  • Burkstrand v. Burkstrand 632 N.W.2d 206 Minn. 2001
  • Marriage of Haefele v. Haefele 621 N.W.2d 758 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
  • Marriage of Haefele v. Haefele 621 N.W.2d 758 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
  • Halverson Ex Rel. Halverson v. Taflin 617 N.W.2d 448 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
  • Halverson Ex Rel. Halverson v. Taflin 617 N.W.2d 448 Minn. Ct. App. 2000
    -281 (Minn.App.1999) (declining to add civil notice procedures to those already provided in the Domestic Abuse Act); (“The requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).
  • Whalen Ex Rel. Whalen v. Whalen 594 N.W.2d 277 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
  • Whalen Ex Rel. Whalen v. Whalen 594 N.W.2d 277 Minn. Ct. App. 1999
    See, (explaining that, if notice were required for ex parte restraining order under Domestic Abuse Act, the order would not provide the immediate remedy that the act contemplates).
  • Hughs on Behalf of Praul v. Cole 572 N.W.2d 747 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
  • Hughs on Behalf of Praul v. Cole 572 N.W.2d 747 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
  • El Nashaar v. El Nashaar 529 N.W.2d 13 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
  • Mechtel v. Mechtel 528 N.W.2d 916 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
  • El Nashaar v. El Nashaar 529 N.W.2d 13 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
  • Mechtel v. Mechtel 528 N.W.2d 916 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
    This court, however, has addressed issues involving ex parte orders since those issues are "capable of repetition yet evading review.” rev'd on other grounds
  • Humenansky v. Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners 525 N.W.2d 559 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
  • Humenansky v. Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners 525 N.W.2d 559 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
    893, 905 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (termination of disability benefits); (ex parte temporary custody order).