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Finally, “[w]here the jury has acquitted the [defendant] of some counts, but convicted the [defendant] of others, we view the verdicts as an indication that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments.” (quotation omitted).

18 (reasoning where jury acquitted appellant of some counts, but convicted appellant of others, members of jury were not unduly prejudiced against the defendant).

The district court instructed the jury that “[n]othing the attorneys say during the trial, including opening statements and closing arguments, is evidence.” (concluding that a 21 prosecutor’s improper statements during closing argument did not warrant reversal in part because the district court instructed the jury that attorney arguments were not evidence).

Finally, “[w]here the jury has acquitted the appellant of some counts, but convicted the appellant of others, we view the verdicts as an indica[tion] that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the 17 prosecutor’s comments.” (quotation omitted).

” repeatedly in closing argument, that word was used throughout the trial, and the jury’s split verdict—finding Williams guilty of the significant-relationship criminal-sexual-conduct charge but not guilty of the mentally impaired/physically helpless charge—serves “ as an ‘indicat[ion] that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments .’” (d 741, 745 (Minn. 1990)).

See State v. Lloyd , (“The resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the [fact-finder] because it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and weigh their credibility.”); State v. Washington , (“The weight and 2 We note that appellant’s behavior at the suppression hearing demonstrated his ability to comprehend and communicate in English.

When the jury has acquitted the defendant on some counts but convicted the defendant of others, “we view the verdicts as an indication that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that “[w]here the jury has acquitted the appellant of some counts, but convicted the appellant of others, we view the verdicts as an ‘indica[tion] that the members of the jury were not unduly’ ” influenced by the trial error (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. DeWald, 463 N.W

“The trial court’s instructions to the jury are also relevant in determining whether the jury was unduly influenced by the [prosecutor’s] improper comments.”

(holding that improper closing argument played no “substantial part in influencing the jury to convict” when argument was “in only [four] of 45 pages” of closing-argument transcript).

(stating that we review a challenge to a prosecutor’s statement in closing argument “as a whole”).

(concluding that having, but not taking, the opportunity to rebut does not affect an appellant’s substantial rights); d 35, 40 (Minn. 1994) (failing to object or seek curative instruction weighs against reversal).

“Where the jury has acquitted the appellant of some counts, but convicted the appellant of others, we view th e verdicts as an indication that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that failing to object or seek a curative instruction weighs against reversal).

See, (waiver by intimidating witness).

at 559 (stating that “the nature and source” of the comment is relevant to analysis); (analyzing prosecutor’s improper statement in context of entire closing argument).

In fact, the disputed statements were, according to the state’s brief to this court, less than “twenty percent of [the state’s] closing remarks.” ( concluding there was no prejudice when improper comments found in only four out of 45 transcript pages).

see also State v. Washington , (“The [district] court’s instructions to the jury are als o relevant in determining wheth er the jury was unduly influenced by the improper comments.”).

-47 (Minn. 2018); State v. Washington

(“Where the jur y has acquitted the appellant of some counts , but convicted the appellant of others, we view the verdicts as an indication that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments.” (quotation omitted)).

(noting that failing to object or seek a curative instruction weighs against r e v e r s a l ) .

(“The trial court’s instructio ns to the jury are also relevant in determining whether the jury was unduly in fluenced by the improper comments.”).

Further, “ [t]he trial court’s instructions to the jury are also relevant in determining whether the jury was unduly influenced by the improper comments.”

(stating principle in context of prosecutorial-misconduct claim).

(“ Where the jury has acquitted the appellant of some counts, but convicted the appellant of others, we view the verdicts as an indication that the members of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments.” (quotation omitted)).

“[C]haracter attacks [are] improper during a prosecutor’s closing argument.” see State v. Sharich, 297 Minn. 19, 23, (“By voluntarily testifying in his own behalf, the accused 9 opens up only the issue of his credibility, not his general character.”); see also Minn. R. Evid.

“Character attacks are improper comments during a prosecutor’s closing argument.” –40 (Minn. 1994) (holding that references to a defendant’s nature were improper character comments).