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“The test for whether a juror can continue to be impartial is whether he or she can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” (quotation omitted).

the [district] court still has the responsibility and power to regulate the conduct of the court proceedings.”

803(4); (applying Minn. R. Evid.

n.2 (Minn. 1996) (describing independent-source and inevitable-discovery doctrines which would prevent suppression of the gun here).

d 197, 208 (Minn. 1996).

d 197, 206 (Minn. 1996).

n.2 (Minn. 1996) (describing the related doctrines of inevitable discovery and independent source).

A warrantless search is permissible “when the delay necessary to obtain a warrant might result in the loss or destruction of the evidence.”

n.2 (Minn. 1996); Licari, d at 251.

d 197, 203 (Minn. 1996) .

The doctrine allows “introduction of otherwise illegally-seized evidence if the police could have retrieved it on the basis of information obtain ed independent of their illegal activity.” n.2 (Minn. 1996).

-10 (Minn. 1996), the supreme court, citing Cox, held that a brief conversation between the defendant and a friend of a juror’s husband did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

(citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95 S. Ct. at 2541 n.46 ).

In addition, the district court must “emphasize to the defendant the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self- representation.’” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975)).

Landlords may only give consent to search when “the tenant has abandoned the property.” , 204 n.2 (Minn. 1996).

see also State v. Richards , (stating that an individual must establish a “legitimate expectation of privacy relating to the area searched 5 or the item seized” to invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protection).

(explaining that a defendant does not have an absolute right to relinquish his self- representation and thereby allow standby counsel to take over the case).

See, (“A finding by a district court of the presence or absence of [juror] bias is based upon 10 determinations of demeanor and credibility and, thus, entitled to deference.” (quotation omitted)); (“Because the decision whether the affected juror may continue to sit involves determinations of credibility and demeanor, which are best left to the [district] court, this court affords the [district] court’s decision significant deference.”).

at 416 ; , 203-04 n. 2 (Minn.1996) (comparing these doctrines).

The inevitable discovery doctrine is closely related to the “independent source” doctrine, which “will countenance introduction of otherwise illegally-seized evidence if the police could have retrieved it on the basis of information obtained independent of their illegal activity.” , 203 n. 2 (Minn.1996) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct.

In addition, “the role of standby counsel is fundamentally different from the role of counsel generally.”

“Standby counsel are present ‘to steer a defendant through the basic procedures of trial’ and ‘to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of [the] courtroom.’ ” (quoting McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184 , 104 S.Ct.

A warrantless search is permissible “when the delay necessary to obtain a warrant might result in the loss or destruction of the evidence.”

See, e.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, (holding that "a corporation is deemed to possess all the powers of a natural person except those powers which are specifically forbidden to such corporations by the law” and that a corporation is seen by the law as "an artificial person”); (stating that Fourth Amendment protection is individual "regardless of whether the one protected is a natural person or a legal fiction, such as a corporation.”) 3 .

More importantly, we have stated that a war-rantless search is permissible “when the delay necessary to obtain a warrant might result in the loss or destruction of the evidence.”

-03, 210 (Minn.1996) (concluding that no prejudice arose from an accidental, minimal contact between the defendant and a juror’s family friend).

We have said that “the Fourth Amendment’s protection is personal and individual,” and “[a] defendant who cannot demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy relating to the area searched or the item seized will not have standing to contest the legality of the search or seizure.”