Cited by

ny other placement for the children” and “would contest any placement or action taken in regard to the children other than placement with them.” (holding that juvenile protection proceedings “require an expeditious resolution of permanency because we will not allow children to linger in uncertainty”); In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., (stating that “child protection cases .

In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003) (“We have consistently held that the supreme court has the primary responsibility under the separation of powers doctrine to regulate matters of trial and appellate procedure.”); see also Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. True Gravity Ventures, LLC, d 837, 844–45 (Minn. 2025) (explaining that

In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003) (“We have consistently held that the supreme court has the primary responsibility under the separation of powers doctrine to regulate matters of trial and appellate procedure.”); see also Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. True Gravity Ventures, LLC, d 837, 844–45 (Minn. 2025) (explaining that

and leads the court to invoke our inherent powers.” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

Nonetheless, “in a limited number of other cases we have recognized our inherent authority to take an appeal in the interests of justice even when the filing or service requirements set forth in a rule or statute have not been met.” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

See In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., (recognizing that delays in resolving child permanency proceedings create “uncertainty [that] can seriously and permanently damage a child’s development of trust and security” (quotation omitted)).

“We require an expeditious resolution of permanency because we will not allow children to linger in uncertainty.” see also In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., (emphasizing that failure to adhere to the timelines established in the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure may result in harm to the child).

“While we recognize and support due process rights of all parties, we decline the invitation to elevate the parents’ rights at the expense of the child’s.” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

P. 1.02(b); see In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

Although we have held that a guardian ad litem who is a party must be served with a notice of appeal in termination-of-parental-rights litigation, In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., d 1, 6 (Minn. 2003), we have not extended that precedent to custody appeals.

In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., n.3 (Minn. 2003).

See R.D.L., d at 134-35; In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

It is true we have recognized our inherent authority to accept an appeal in the interests of justice “even when the filing or service requirements set forth in a rule or statute have not been met.” In re J.R., Jr.

See also In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., (explaining that rules governing court procedure control over statutes in juvenile protection cases).

See R.D.L., d at 135 (stating that purpose of Children’s Justice Initiative is to ensure that “every Minnesota child, regardless of location, has the best possible ch ance for a safe and permanent home, at the earliest possible time ” (quotation omitted)); (discussing importance of resolving child-protection matters in a fair and final manner); Minn. R. Juv.

But we have held on similar facts that an order denying a appeal with the clerk of the appellate courts and timely service on the adverse party are the jurisdictional steps required to initiate an appeal.’” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003).

The reason for these timelines is that “[w]e require an expeditious resolution of permanency because we will not allow children to linger in uncertainty.” (explaining that “time for a child is different than time for adults,” and “from a child’s view, a delay is a delay regardless of the reason”).

“The prolonged uncertainty for children of not knowing whether they will be removed from home, whether and when they will 9 return home, when they might be moved to another foster home, or whether, and when they may be placed in a new permanent home is frightening.” d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).

See, (noting that dela ys affect “a child’s o pportunity to have a 12 permanent home”); (characterizing “untoward delay” in resolu tion of certain child-c ustody matters as “intolerable”); Majestic Inc. v. Berry , (Minn. Ap

Standard Oil Co. v. King, 238 Minn. 81, 83, see also In re J.R., Jr. , d 1, 4 n.3 (Minn. 2003) (explaining that the district court is in the best position to “evaluate the reasonableness of the excuse, the prejudice to the other party, and whether the party has a reasonable” claim or defense).

The principle that child protection cases are to receive priority and be resolved quickly is a thoroughly engrained policy that both the legislative and executive branches endorse and support.” (citations omitted)); In re Welfare of J.R. , (“Each delay in the termination of a parent’ s rights equates to a delay in a child’ s opportunity to have a permanent home.”).

The supreme court ha s also emphasized that “[e]ach delay in the termination of a parent’s rights equates to delay in a child’s o pportunity to have a permanent home and can seriously affect a child’s chance for permanent placement.” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr. , (Mi nn.

In re J.R., Jr., n.3 (Minn. 2003); see also Flaherty v. Allstate Ins.

7 (1952); see also In re J.R., Jr., n.3 (Minn. 2003) (explaining that the district court is in the best position to “evaluate the reasonableness of the excuse, the prejudice to the other party, and whether the party has a reasonable” claim or defense).

.” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.

See In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., (“Each delay in the termination of a parent’s rights equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a permanent home and can seriously affect a child’s chance for permanent placement.”).

See Minn. Stat. § 260C.204 (2014) (providing for permanency progress review when child has been in foster care for six months); In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., (“Each delay in the termination of a parent’s rights equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a permanent home and can seriously affect a child’s chance for permanent placement.”).

In addressing a timeliness issue under these rules, our supreme court has said that “[e]ach delay in the termination of a parent’s rights equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a permanent home.” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr.