Cited by

d 348, 353-54 (Minn. 1994).

The bar for relevancy is not high as “Rule 401 adopts a minimal relevancy approach.” (quotation omitted); (“Generally, evidence is relevant if in some degree it advances the inquiry and thus has probative value.” (quotation omitted)).

“A prosecutor commits misconduct by intentionally misstating evidence,” and by “eliciting inadmissible evidence,” Ramey, d at 300 (-54 (Minn. 1994)).

Second, Kambon argues that we erred in our 1995 decision on Kambon’s direct appeal from his conviction when we did not order the district 1 In addition to the claims before us on appeal, Kambon asserted in his postconviction petition that, at trial, the prosecution improperly exploited certain witnesses’

n redirect that she did not like Juring because he is a “bad person” on account of “the things that [she] testified [about at trial] like physical abuse and sexual abuse and threats.” A prosecutor cannot ask questions “calculated to elicit or insinuate inadmissible and highly prejudicial character evidence and which are asked in the face of a clear trial court prohibition.”

Caldwell contends that the prosecutor violated the principle that the state may not “deprive a defendant of a fair trial by means of insinuations and innuendos which plant in the minds of the jury a prejudicial belief in the existence of evidence which is otherwise inadmissible.” (quotation omitted).

See, d 348, 353 (Minn. 1994) (finding that evidence of threats of serious harm and death allegedly made by the defendant against three witnesses was properly admitted, but holding that the district court erred in failing to provide a cautionary instruction regarding the threats); –58 (Minn

See, (concluding that, although “[t]he state had a strong case against Mayhorn,” nonetheless “even the strongest evidence of guilt does not eliminate a defendant’s right to a fair trial”); –55 (Minn. 1994) (noting that “[t]he prosecutor had a strong case,” but “it [was] not clear to us whether the jury found Harris guilty because of the relevant evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, or because of inadmissible evidence and innuendo”); (r

Ramey, d at 300; -54 (Minn. 1994); review denied (Minn. Nov.

at 300 (citing State v. Harris , –54 (Minn. 1994)).

Even relevant evidence “may be inadmissible where its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential to cause unfair prejudice, to confuse th e issues, or to mislead the jury.” -52 (Minn. 1994); see Minn. R. Evid.

d 348, 353 (Minn. 1994) (holding a prosecutor’s efforts to elicit inadmissible evidence, among other errors, deprived the defendant of a fair trial).

See State v. 9 Harris, (stating that evidence of a defendant’s witness tampering is relevant to show defendant’s consciousness of guil t).

The supreme court has stated that “[q]uestions by a prosecutor calculated to elicit or insinuate inadmissible and highly prejudicial character evidence and which are asked in the face of a clear trial court prohibition are not tolerable.”

“Generally, evidence is relevant if in some degree it advances th e inquiry and thus has probative value.” (quotation omitted).

it just didn’t happen, so but if it had we probably wouldn’t be having a trial in this matter.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has “made it clear that the state will not be permitted to deprive a defendant of a fair trial by means of insinuations and innuendos which plant in the minds of a jury a prejudicial belief in the existence of evidence which is otherwise inadmissible.” d 348, 354 (Minn. 1994) (quotations omitted).

However, “even relevant evidence may be inadmissible where its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential to cause unfair prejudice, to confuse the issues, or to mislead the jury.” d 348, 351-52 (Minn. 1994) (citing Minn. R. Evid.

“Generally, evidence is relevant if in some degree it advances the inquiry and thus has probative value.” State v. Harris , (quotation omitted).

It is reversible error for the prosecutor to “d eprive a defendant of a fair trial by means of insinuations and innuendos which plant in the minds of the jury a prejudicial belief in the existence of evidence which is otherwise inadmissible.” (quotation omitted).

to support his position.

“We have made it clear that [t]he state will not be permitted to deprive a defendant of a fair trial by means of insinuations and innuendos which plant in the minds of the jury a prejudicial belief in the existence of evidence which is otherwise inadmissible.” (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).

103(a))); (“Questions by a prosecutor calculated to elicit or insinuate inadmissible and highly prejudicial character evidence and which are asked in the face of a clear trial court prohibition are not tolerable.”).

–53 (Minn. 1994) (discussing prosecutor’s implication that the defendant was the reason for a witness’s participation in the witness-protection program).

prosecutor in his closing warranted a new trial, including suggesting that no salve exists for the conscience of the jury 13 members should they acquit and referring seven times to “[defendant’s] School of Sex Education” in closing, although this title was not based on any evidence or any reasonable inference from the evidence); (concluding that prosecutor’s examination of three witnesses improperly implied that the defendant caused them all to enter witness protection).

“Generally, evidence is relevant if in some degree it advances the inquiry and thus has probative 6 value.” (quotation omitted).

Evidence of a threat made by the defendant against a witness is relevant to show the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt.” 353 (Minn. 1994) (holding that evidence of death threats made against three witnesses, including phone calls at home, was relevant to show consciousness of guilt); see also Mayhom, d at 783 (holding that evidence of voicemail messages sent to a witness threatening: “ ‘What’s up man?

In State v. Harris, upon which Carridine relies, we stated, “Questions by a prosecutor calculated to elicit or insinuate inadmissible and highly prejudicial character evidence and which are asked in the face of a clear trial court prohibition are not tolerable.” (holding that the State committed prejudicial misconduct by exposing the jury to two inadmissible, prior bad acts).