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“[I]f a biased juror is improperly allowed to sit in judgment of a criminal defendant and the issue is properly raised and preserved, the error has undermined the basic structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not amenable to harmless-error review.” State v. Logan , (quotation omitted).

(addressing “issues raised by defendant on appeal that may arise on retrial”); (addressing an issue raised by a defendant “in the interests of judicial economy because it will likely arise again on remand”).

In support of his argument Ulrich cites two decisions as authority for what he claims to be the appropriate standard: d at 569

sonable-doubt jury instruction); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1984) (denial of a public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self-representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (denial of counsel); -53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a 7 biased judge as fact-finder); -25 (Minn. 1995) (denial of right to an impartial jury).

Fraga , d at 625– 26; (agreeing that “if a biased juror is improperly allowed to sit in judgment of a criminal defendant and the issue is properly raised and preserved, the error has undermined the basic ‘structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not amenabl e to harmless-error review’ ” (citation om

See Bobo, d at 492; (“If defendant had .

Examples of structural errors in clude denial of a public trial, Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 (1984); absence of an impartial judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); denial of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); failure to dismiss a biased juror, a conflict of interest in representation throughout the entire proceeding, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); and absence of counsel from an arraignment proceeding that affected an entire trial because defenses not asserted

the supreme court concluded that the district court erred because the prospective juror stated that he would tend to favor the testimony of a police officer but he would “be objective, .

y deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2217 (1984) (denial of public-trial right); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self - representation at trial); -53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a biased judge as fact -finder); State v. Logan , -25 (Minn. 1995) (denial of right to impartial jury by not dismissing biased juror).

The district court’s resolution of whether a prospective juror’s protestation of impartiality is credible is a determination of credibility and demeanor an d, therefore, is e ntitled to 9 “special deference.”

el at trial and non-impartial judges as structural errors ); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 –78 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self -representation at trial); –53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a biased judge as fact finder); State v. Reiners , (erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge); –25 (Minn. 1995) (prejudice resulting from failure to dismiss a potential juror for cause).

“A reviewing court should give deference to the district court’s ruling o n challenges for cause because the district court is in the best position to observe and judge the demeanor of the prospective juror.” (quotation omitted); (stating that district court’s decision is entitled to “special deference” because it is “essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor”) (quotation omitted).

(holding that the error is structural if a biased juror is allowed to sit in judgment of a criminal defendant).

Our review of the district court’s findings of juror impartiality is esp ecially deferential because “the question of whether a juror is impartial is a credibility determination.” State v. Prtine , d 303, 310 (Minn. 2010) ( 3 (Minn. 1995)).

(2) statements that a juror would believe the testimony of a police officer over others, and that she would try to be fair but when making a judgment call, she would favor police testimony, -10 (Minn. 2010); and (3) statements by a juror that police officers generally are truthful and do not lie under oath

Fraga, d at 623; (stating that the question of whether a juror is impartial amounts to a credibility determination, and an appellate court defers to the district court’s finding of impartiality).

d 320, 324 (Minn. 1995).

We grant particular deference to the district court on a determination of juror impartiality because the question is “essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor.” (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984)).

“A reviewing court should give deference to the district court’s ruling on challenges for cause because the district court is ‘in the best position to observe and judge the demeanor of the prospective juror.’” (); (holding that the question of whether a juror is impartial is a credibility determination and that appellate courts defer to a district court’s finding of impartiality).

r v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984) (denial of the right to a public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self-representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531–32 (1927) (deprivation of the right to an impartial judge); (failure to dismiss a biased juror for cause).

749 (1927) (deprivation of the right to an impartial judge); (failure to dismiss a biased juror for cause).

in the questionnaire that he “ ‘would favor the testimony of a police officer over a non-police officer’ ” and “ ‘give the cops a lot of leeway’ ”); (involving a prospective juror indicating that she knew various law enforcement personnel and stated: “ T guess to be honest, I would be more inclined to believe [police officers]’ ”); -23 (Minn.1995)(involving a prospective juror answering that it would be “ ‘virtually impossible for [him] to conclude as a juror that a police officer had testified

(“We give great deference to the district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge, recognizing that the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may consider.” (citations omitted)); (“As a general rule, the trial court’s resolution of the question whether the prospective juror’s protestation of impartiality is believable is entitled to ‘special deference’ because ‘the determination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demean- or’ ” (citation

944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (denial of the right to self-representation at trial); -25 (Minn.1995) (prejudice resulting from failure to dismiss a potential juror for cause).