Cited by

Thus, a district court cannot enter judgments of conviction for “two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

(holding defendant was improperly convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct 14 “based on the same evidence and the same acts, all of which occurred before complainant turned 13”).

on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

(holding defendant was improperly convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct “based on the same evidence and the same acts, all of which occurred before complainant turned 13”).

1, to mean that “a defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

Thus, a district court cannot enter judgments of conviction for “two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

Thus, a district court cannot enter judgments of conviction for “two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

(different sections of the [criminal] statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

-75 (Minn. 1989), and State v. Hadgu addressed a federal INS detainer, which this court distinguished as having a “non-penal purpose” and stated that the interjurisdictional rule on jail credit did not apply.

And a defendant cannot be “convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of c onduct.” State v. Folley , d 372, 373 (Minn. 1989) (vacating one of two convictions for criminal sexual conduct when both were based on the same evidence of the same acts); ( stating that second-degree criminal sexual conduct is a lesser included offense of first -degree criminal sexual condu

Section 609.04 further prohibits convictions for “two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or differen t subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

1, precludes a defendant from being “convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.” State v. Folley

Section 609.04 prohibits convictions for “two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

Section 609.04 bars multiple convictions of criminal sexual conduct arising from “the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

26, 2009) ; see also 10 State v. Folley , (interpreting Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd.

Because of this, “a defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.” State v. Folley

on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.” see also State v. Jackson , (“[W]e have consistently held that section 609.04 bars multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.”) .

16 In State v. Folley, the supreme court explained, “As we have interpreted Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (1988), a defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.” (footnote omitted).

The supreme court has interpreted this statute to mean that “a defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary cour se of conduct.” State v. Folley

The supreme court has interpreted section 609.04 to “bar[] multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” (citing cases); -54 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Aug.

The supreme court has interpreted Minn. Stat. § 609.04 to mean that “a defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

See also State v. Folley , , 374 (Minn. 1989) ("[T]he total amount of time a defendant is incarcerated should not turn on matters that are subject to manipulation....").

r one act simply because a defendant’s single act violated multiple provisions of a statute.”), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1997), and State v. Folley , where a defendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct toward a complainant when she was under the age of 13 and when she was under the age of 16 based on “the same evidence and the same acts” occurring before the complainant turned 13

on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

“[A] defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct 5 (different sections of the same statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

“[A] defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the same statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

1 (2014) states that a person “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” But to be a lesser included charge, the defendant must be convicted of two different charges based on the same act or “unitary course of conduct.” d 372, 373 (Minn. 1989).

Section 609.04 also prohibits a defendant from being convicted “of two counts of criminal sexual conduct (different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or unitary course of conduct.”

(holding that defendant was entitled to the credit requested because the two sentences imposed were concurrent, and in the case of concurrent sentences the defendant should be “able to apply the jail time against both of them” (quoting State v. Patrice

(advising courts “to ensure that the withholding of jail credit does not result in a de facto departure with respect to consecutive service”).

(-75 (Minn.1989)); -30 (Minn.1990) (also quoting Folley); -10 (Minn.1985).