Cited by

App. P. 103.04, if the district court “explicitly used the temporary order for relief as a basis to amend the Judgment and Decree.” n.1 (Minn. App. 1996).

“In dissolution proceedings, debts are apportioned as part of the property settlement and are treated in the same manner as the division of assets.” d 706, 712 (Minn. App. 1996).

rev. denied (Minn. May 31, 1985).

.2d 720, 724 (Minn. 1950) (discussing 10 discretionary powers conferred by statute); see also, (reviewing a previous permutation of section 257.66 and noting that the district court has broad discretion to determine child-support obligations, including past child support); -11 (Minn. App. 1996) (holding a district court may order retroactive child support in a final dissolution judgment if it considers all payments made since the separation and the relevant facts and circumstances).

The district court concluded that it “was not presented with enough evidence to comfortably establish [retroactive] child support during the pendency of this action.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “a parent’s obligation to support [their] children commences with the child’s birth.” (ordering, in a final decree, retroactive child support dating back to the parties’ date of separation).

We review a district court’s determination of child-support obligations for an abuse of discretion, and do not reverse its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, In re Civ.

“The [district] court has broad discretion in determining child[-]support obligations and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

See Korf v. Korf , n.1 (Minn. App. 1996) (stating that orders for temporary relief are not final appealable orders, and a reviewing court considers an order for temporary relief only if the district court used the order as a basis for its final ruling).

–11 (Minn. App. 23 1996) (allowing the district court to award child support retroactiv ely by considering all payments made since the parties’ separation); (holding that “a parent’s obligation to support his child commences with the child’s birth”

See (“In dissolution proceedings, debts are apportioned as part of the property settlement and 10 Wife also argues that the wedding perfume and the wedding jewelry no longer exist.

n. 1 (Minn. App. 1996); Hennepin County v. Griffin , see also Minn. R. Civ.

(affirming award of conduct -based attorney fees based in part on party’s “noncooperation and obstinate position”).

d 706, 712 (Minn. App. 1996).

d 706, 710 (Minn. App. 1996).

(stating that the provision of medical insurance for children is “in the nature of child support”).

(explaining that property divisions reasonably based in fact and principle will be affirmed); see also Hattstrom, d at 337 (suggesting that courts should attempt to achieve equity when distributing rights and liabilities).

The medical needs of a minor child, including insurance coverage, “are in the nature of child support.” (citations omitted).

Thomas cannot avoid the obligation to support his child by arguing that another man (Nyman) “will be a better father.” “The obligation of all parents, men and women, to love and support their children begins at birth.” (“[A] parent’s obligation to support his child commences with the child’s birth.”).