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“ The predominant importance of [an] older child is a well settled part of Minnesota law.”

Endangerment requires a showing of “a significant degree of danger.”

the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an independent, reliable preference”) ; (noting that “[t]here is serious question when dealing with [an elder teenager] whether [district] courts can practically contradict the child’s choice even if it was shown to be misguided”).

(holding that “[t]he choice of an older teenage child is an overwhelming consideration in [ ] deciding whether [she] is endangered by preserving the custodial placement [she] opposes”).

ing the best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody and parenting time, the district court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including “the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an independent, reliable preference.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd.1(a)(3) (2022); (“The choice of an older teenage child is 5 an overwhelming consideration in determining the child’s custody.”); (stating t

“The existence of endangerment must be determined ‘on the particular facts of each case.’” (), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

6 Endangerment requires “a showing of a significant degree of danger,” “but the danger may be purely to emotional development,”

(stating that endangerment may be purely to emotional development); (stating that movant alleging endangerment must show a “significant degree of danger”).

16 “‘The concept of “endangerment” is unusually imprecise’” and depends “on the particular facts of each case.” Goldman, d at 285 (); (quotation omitted) .

“While ‘[t]he concept of “endangerment” is unusually imprecise, in the context of child custody, the legislature likely intended to demand a showing of a significant degree of danger.’” Sharp, d at 263 ( 9 (Minn. App. 1991) ).

Our court has held that the endangerment standard, though “impre cise,” requires “a showing of a significant degree of danger.” see Goldman, d at 285 (quoting these aspects of Ross).

See M.J.H., d at 440 (indicating that the moving party must show that “the children’s present environment endangers their physical health, emotional health, or emotional development”); see also Ross v. Ross , (requiring a “significant degree of danger” to show endangerment).

The concept of “e ndangerment” denotes a qualitative standard that requires a sho wing of a “significant degree of danger .”

First, Kysylyczyn contends that a district court should defer to an older child’s “choice,” pointing to Ross v. Ross , , and similar caselaw.

(noting that, in the context of a custody dispute, “[t]he choice of an older teenage child is an overwhelming consideration in determining the child’s custody”).

1(a)(3) (providing that one of the best -interests factors the district court must consider is “the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an i ndependent, reliable preference”); 757 (Minn. App. 1991) (stating that “[t]he choice of an older teenage child is an overwhelming consideration in determining the child’s custody or in deciding whether he is endangered by preserving the custodial placement he opposes” and

Similarly, in Ross v. Ross , we determined that “[t]he choice of an older te enage child is an overwhelming consideration in determining the child’s [best interests].”

Goldman v. Greenwood , ().

An endangerment finding requires a showing of a “significant degree of danger.”

10 to demand a showing of a significant degree of danger.” (quotation omitted).

LaBelle, d at 293; d 753, 756 (Minn. App. 1991)

A child’s preference with respect to custody and visitation matters is of “predominant importance.” Ross v. Ross , see also State ex rel.

Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv); d 753, 756 (Minn. App. 1991).

This court addressed how district courts should use a child’s and Steinke.

Although this court has previously cautioned that “the concept of endangerment is unusually imprecise,” this court clarified that “the legislature likely intended to demand a showing of a significant degree of danger.”

Endangerment demands a showing of a “significant degree of danger.”

29, 1986)) ); Ross v. Ross , (noting that a child’s emotional problems resulted in academic problems which could be addressed by a change of custody).

d 753, 755 (Minn. App. 1991).

(stating that “the legislature likely intended to demand a showing of a significant degree of danger”); see, -14 (Minn. App. 1991) (holding that allegations of emotional abuse by stepfather who was “yelling, throwing things, hitting walls, and drivi

The change in circumstances “must have occurred since 1 Appellant asserts that we should conduct a de novo review of the district court’s denial of her motion to modify custody

The district court also ruled that a second prima-facie-case factor was not met because “the facts alleged by [Mitchell] do not rise to the level of endangerment in the 6 child’s present environment.” The endangerment requirement contemplates “a significant degree of danger.”