Cited by

In cases involving a charge for possession of a weapon as an ineligible person, defendants may generally stipulate to the prior crime that rendered them ineligible, and “[i]n the vast majority of such cases, the potential of the evidence [of the prior crime] for unfair prejudice clearly outweighs its probative value.”

See State v. Davidson , (“We believe that generally in a prosecution for being a felon in po ssession of a weapon the defendant should be permitted to remove the issue of whether he is a convicted felon by stipulating to that fact.”).

that generally in a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a weapon the defendant should be permitted to remove the issue of whether he is a conv icted felon by stipulating to that fact,” but “the door should be left open so that in appropriate cases where the probative value of the evidence outweighs is potential for unfair prejudice, the evidence may be admitted.”

23 -25 (Minn. 2004) (affirming conviction based on undercover agent’s testimony that defendant agreed to sell him methamphetamine and later produced package of methamphetamine); -01 (Minn. App. 2011) ( affirming conviction based on defendan t’s admission to handling and hiding methamphetamine) ; see also State v. Davidson , -10 (Minn. 1984) (affirming conviction of unlawful possession of firearm based on officers’ testimony that defendant inserted something in pants and hid near van where firear

Appellant relies on three cases: WL 817266 (Minn. App. Mar.

In the vast majority of such cases the potential of the evidence fo r unfair prejudice clearly outweighs its probative value.”

“[ I]n a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a weapon the defendant should be permitted to remove the issue of whether he is a convicted felon by stipulating to that fact.”

“Courts may limit the scope of a defendant’s arguments to ensure that the defendant does not confuse the jury with misleading inferences.” ().

the need for relevant evidence by offering to stipulate, particularly where the evidence sought to be excluded 10 would bear in any way upon any other issues not covered by th e stipulation.” (quotation omitted).

d 8 388, 390 (Minn. App. 1984).

(stating that, while stipulation can bar evidence of a prior conviction, “[p]rior convictions would still be [usable] under Minn. R. Evid.

Alternatively, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to change “prohibited” to “unlawful.” the defendant was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a handgun.

In short, Quesada argues that the district court’s

(citing United States v. Bednar, 728 F.2d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir.1984)); -13 (Minn.1984).

The supreme court’s leads us to a different conclusion.

(citing State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 421 , ).

See, -12 (Minn.1984); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 , 117 S.Ct.

(stating “[t]he reason for the general rule is that a defendant should not be able to unilaterally control the issue of the need for relevant evidence by offering to stipulate * * *.”).

(discussing the prejudice and the circumstances warranting admission of prior felony evidence).

see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 , 117 S.Ct.

(allowing defendant accused of being felon in possession of firearm to stipulate to felon status and have trial limited to issue of firearm possession, with jury instructed that defendant stipulated to fact that he was not legally entitled to possess firearm); (Minn.Ap