Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Jude, 514 N.W.2d 779.

18 citing documents.

  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Joseph Harju. Minn. Ct. App. 2026
    7 A committed person is entitled to discharge from civil commitment under the Due Process Clause if they are “no longer mentally ill or is no longer a danger to himself” and if “the nature and duration of commitment [do not] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” (quotation omitted); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[T]here is .
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Hollis Larson. Minn. Ct. App. 2026
    To satisfy due process, an individual’s continued commitment must generally “bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Samuel Omwando Nyaboga. Minn. Ct. App. 2025
    –84 (Minn. 1994) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) and Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)).
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Eric Matthew Flanders. Minn. Ct. App. 2022
    “A state may deprive a person who is mentally ill and dangerous of his or her liberty by confinement to a mental institution without violating due process until such time as that person is no longer mentally ill or is no longer a danger to himself.”
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: James Allen Martin. Minn. Ct. App. 2022
    “Due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” (citation omitted) .
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Kaylis L. Bellaphant. Minn. Ct. App. 2021
    A person who has a mental illness and is dangerous to the public is entitled to discharge under the Due Process Clause if he or she “is no longer mentally ill or is no longer a danger to h imself” and if “the nature and duration of commitment [do not] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” Lidberg v. Steffen , (quotation omitted).
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Esteban Trevino. Minn. Ct. App. 2021
    nder the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 4 Constitution to not be confined because of a mental illness withou t due process, which ensures both that the person cannot be confined unless ment ally ill and “‘that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasona ble relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.’” (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972))
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Leon Onyango Opiacha. Minn. Ct. App. 2020
    the committed person argued that he had a due - process right to be released because he no longer was dangerous.
  • In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ely Ovis Emmanuel Sabahot Minn. Ct. App. 2017
  • Meriwether Minnesota Land & Timber, LLC v. State 818 N.W.2d 557 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
    “Equal protection requires that persons similarly situated be treated similarly.” (“The equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law.”).
  • Irwin v. Goodno 686 N.W.2d 878 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
    (addressing earlier version of commitment statute); -83 (Minn.1994) (addressing current version of statute).
  • In re P.T. 657 N.W.2d 577 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
    (citation omitted); LaChapelle, d at 165 .
  • In Re PT 657 N.W.2d 577 Minn. Ct. App. 2003
    (citation omitted); LaChapelle, d at 165 .
  • Marriage of Walker v. Walker 574 N.W.2d 761 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
    “Equal protection requires that persons similarly situated be treated similarly.” (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 , 102 S.Ct.
  • Caprice v. Gomez 552 N.W.2d 753 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
    (examining Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd.
  • Kottschade v. City of Rochester 537 N.W.2d 301 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
    Equal Protection “Equal protection requires that persons similarly situated be treated similarly.” (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 , 102 S.Ct.
  • Call v. Gomez 535 N.W.2d 312 Minn. 1995
    1845, 1858 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972)
  • In Re Dirks 530 N.W.2d 207 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
    (state owes community higher degree of protection from someone committed as mentally ill and dangerous than as mentally ill).