Cited by

“The first two prongs are compulsory, but the 5 Seeman also contends that the district court erroneously applied the Rainer standard— which applies to claims of newly discovered evidence, d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997) —to his false-testimony claim.

03 (Minn. 2024); see Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004).4 But we apply the Rainer test to claims of newly discovered evidence “when new discoveries impugn testimony that was given as an opinion or was factually accurate at the time of the trial.” Kaiser, d at 103

r and opinion,” the district court analyzed Duol’s newly discovered evidence claim under two tests: the three-prong test from Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87–88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), 4 for claims of false trial testimony, for claims of newly discovered evidence.

When raised in a timely filed postconviction petition

-88 (Minn. 1982) (citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928)).

But “the allegations raised in the petition must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support.”

Additionally, if Williams did meet that standard, the court held he would still have to meet the test established by our court in Rainer v. State, which, among other things, requires new evidence to “probably produce an acquittal or a more favorable result.”

A new expert opinion that merely differs from a trial expert’s opinion does not establish that the trial expert’s opinion was false, and such a

“To receive an evidentiary hearing on a timely postconviction claim of newly discovered evidence, [the petitioner] is required to allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, ”

Turnage, d at 599 (“We have said that to carry this burden petitioners must do more than offer conclusory, argumentative 29 assertions, without factual support.”); (holding that an anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to an evidentiary hearing).

9 Here, as in Gilbert, the state argues the postconviction court should have analyzed the false-testimony claim under the standard set forth in Rainer v. State , .

McRaven is entitled to an evidentiary hearing for newly discovered evidence if the facts asserted in the petition could satisfy the four-factor test set out in Rainer v. State

17 Johnson is entitled to an evidentiary hearing for newly discovered evidence—K.J.’s jailhouse statement—

(setting forth test for determining whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence).

8 applies for assessing whether newly discovered evidence requires a new trial.

d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997) (recognizing that a de fendant may be entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence if he proves that (1) the evidence was not known to him at the time of trial; (2) the evidence could not have been discovered before trial through due diligence; (3) the new evidence “is not cumulative

7 The district court concluded that Bobo was not entitled to a new trial under the newly discovered evidence standard from Rainer v. State

e, a petitioner must prove the evidence: “(1) was not known to the defendant or defense counsel at the time of the trial; (2) could not have been discovered through due diligence before trial; (3) is not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and (4) would probably result in an acquittal or a more favorable result.” d 585, 590 (Minn. 2017) (citing Rainer v. State , ).

3 The district court erred by applying the test articulated in Rainer v. State , for assessing whether newly discovered evidence merits a new trial.

” Our review of postconviction proceedings is “limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.” 695 (Minn. 1997) .

Pearson v. State , (emphasis omitted) ().

Roby v. State , n.5 (Minn. 2011) (citing Rainer v. State , d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997)).

We conclude that Andersen did not establish that he is entitled to a , 695 (Minn. 1997), –85 (Minn. 1982) (citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 –88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione , 357 F.3d 712, 718 3 (7th Cir. 2004)).

A postconviction petitioner seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must show, in relevant part, that the evidence is not merely “cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful,” and that it likely would “produce an acquittal or a more favorable result .”

andard, a petitioner must prove “(1) that the evidence was not known to the defendant or his/her counsel at the time of the trial; (2) that the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence before trial; (3) that the evidence is not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and (4) that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal or a more favorable result.”

Rainer v. State , , 695 (Minn. 1997) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

For the same reason, Wayne's argument that he is entitled to a new trial under the test identified in Rainer v. State , , 695 (Minn. 1997), is unavailing.

To obtain an evid entiary hearing on a timely pos tconviction claim of newly discovered evidence, a petitioner must “allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, d 692 (Minn. 1997).” Bobo, d at 517.