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During the district court’s final instructions to the jury, it told the jury that “the arguments or other remarks of an attorney are not evidence.” “ We assume that the jury follows a court’s instructions.”

“We assume that the jury follows a court’s instructions.”

833 (Minn. 1998); (providing that the “third prong of the plain error test is the equivalent of [the] harmless error analysis” and analyzing the four factors outlined in Ferguson).

1 (assuming that jurors follow jury instructions).

Accordin gly, “one witness cannot vouch for or against the credibility of another witness.” State v. Ferguson

d 824, 836 (Minn. 1998).

may not be proved by extrinsic evidence,” and it is well established that an examining attorney who “inquires into collateral matters on cross -examination, including those matters relating to the witness’ credibility, is bound by the answers he receives.” (quotation omitted).

A limiting instruction to the jury mitigates the potential for unfair prejudice, see State v. Kennedy , and we assume that jurors follow the district court’s instructions

d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998).

A limiting instruction to the jury mitigates the potential for unfair prejudice, and we assume that the jury follows the district court’s instructions

29, 2008); (stating that this court assumes that a jury follows the district court’s instructions).

29, 2008); (stating that this court assumes that a jury follows the district court’s instructions).

These cautionary instructions “lessened the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” Lindsey, d at 757 (quotation omitted); (stating we assume the jury follows a district court’s instructions).

(stating that we assume the jury follows a district court’s instructions).

See Taylor, d at 207 (stating that “[w]e presume that the jury follow[s] the court’s instructions,” and declining to order a new trial on a claim of misstated evidence ().

(observing that the court assumes that the jury follows a district court's instruction).

tial element of the crime under section 609.229, and that exclusion of such evidence would “render[] convictions under [that section] nearly impossible to obtain”); –77 (Minn. 2009) (holding that, despite danger of unfair prejudice, expert testimony about gangs was admissible to prove that the defendant committed murder to benefit a gang); –35 (Minn. 1998) (holding that evidence of gang graffiti in defendant’s bedroom was highly prejudicial but admissible in first-degree murder case because it w

(holding that testimony is not vouching where it does not assert that a witness is telling the truth or should be believed over another).