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“In closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (“While the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence 2 Milhausen did not renew his objection at the time the state offered the unredacted warrant of commitment.

Love’s got everything to do with it.” Love contends that the prosecutor’s in which the prosecutor referred to an imaginary “James Porter School of Sex Education.” Id.

A prosecutor’s closing argument “need not be colorless, [but ] it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” (quotation omitted).

See, e.g. , -64 (Minn. 1995) (holding prosecutorial error occurred when the prosecutor told the jury members they were “big .

(stating that prosecutor’s closing argument must be “based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence”).

“In closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (“While the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” (quotation omitted)).

The state’s argument “must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence,” but it “need not be colorless.” (quotation omitted).

A prosecutor’s closing argument must be “based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.”

And because the prosecutor’s arguments to the jury were “based on the evidence produced at trial,” we conclude the state did not err when it described the victim’s wounds during opening and closing arguments.

And “once the jury’s prejudices or passions have been invoked, a cautionary instruction may not be sufficient to undo the damage, particularly, where as here, the [district] court’s curative 30 instruction, while strong, addressed some but not all of the misconduct.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Caselaw is clear that a prosecutor’s closing argument cannot “play on the jurors’ emotions and fears,” and may not imply “that the jury could serve public safety by delivering a verdict demonstrating public intolerance of a crime,” rev. denied (Minn. Oct.

Prosecutors have a duty to “avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

(observing that while the state’s closing argument need not 20 be “colorless,” it must be based on the evidence produced at trial or reasonable inferences from that evidence).

Williams invokes the well-established rule that, “[i]n closing argument, a prosecutor must ‘avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.’” ().

And a prosecutor’s closing argument need not be “colorless.” State v. Porter , –64 (Minn. 1995).

In his closing, the prosecutor argued that, “[w]e certainly didn’t hear any credible character evidence that he’s not violent or that he’s not in a gang.” A closing argument “must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.”

But the argument “must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” Patzold, d at 808 (d 359, 363 (Minn. 1995)).

B. Inflaming the Jury “The prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

During closing arguments, the prosecution “must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.”

Even where misconduct occurs, we will reverse only when “the defendant was denied a fair trial.”

A prosecutor “must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.” accord State v. Mayhorn, 10 - 87 (Minn. 2006).

“[A] prosecutor may not seek a conviction at any price” and “must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.” -63 (Minn. 1995).

In State v. Porter, for example, the supreme court found that “[t]o the extent that the closing argument suggested to the jurors that they would be suckers if they acquitted [the defendant],” the prosecutor engaged in serious misconduct that “struck at the heart of the jury syst em.” (M inn.

State v. Yang, 627N.W.2d 666, 679 (Minn. App. 2001) (), review denied (Minn. July 24, 2001).

“While the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” State v. Porter , d 359, 363 (Minn. 1995) (quotatio n omitted).

-65 (Minn. 1995) (determining a prosecuting attorney committed misconduct when arguing that the testimony of a witness 12 was “without impeachment”).

Fisherman claims that the prosecutor “explicitly told the jury that the case was not about [his] guilt or inno cence,” and instead, it was about “law and order in the prisons to protect prison guards.” A “prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant.” State v. Porter

But a prosecutor’s closing arguments “must be based on the evidence prod uced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” State v. Porter

Id.; (stating that prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor’s impermissible arguments permeate an entire closing argument and are intended to play on the fears and emotions of a jury).