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to bolster his argument.

of a witness is stronger at the time of recantation than it was at trial), and Campbell, d at 508 (stating that while a sworn statement may be reliable, a letter recanting testimony is not if it is handwritten and does not contain a clear author), with Wilson, d at 104-05, 107 (concluding that a jailhouse informant recanting in writing is reliable), (concluding that a notarized statement from a witness’s father stating that the witness had confessed to testifying falsely is reliable).

But “the Larrison standard applies broadly to all allegations of false trial testimony.” d 766, 775 (Minn. 2014); (“[T]he proper test to apply when evaluating a claim for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence of falsified testimony is the three-prong Larrison test.”).

To prevail on a request for an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner “must allege facts that would, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, entitle him to relief.”

“This procedural bar applies even in postconvictio n proceedings raising constitutional issues of criminal procedure.” Ferguson v. State

(“A three-prong test, known as the Larrison test, is applied to claims of newly-discovered evidence of falsified testimony.” (footnote omitted)).

An evidentiary hearing must be granted when a petitioner alleges “facts that would, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, entitle him to relief.”

Ferguson v. State , , 445 (Minn. 2002).

Ferguson v. State , , 446 (Minn. 2002).

“A petitioner se eking postconviction relief has the burden of establishing, by a fair prep onderance of the eviden ce, facts that would warrant relief.”

We have explained that “[t]he decision to admit guilt is the defendant’s decision to make.”

Furthermore, “allegations in a postconviction petition must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support.” (quotation omitted).

“Although the four-prong Rainer test is the correct test for newly-discovered evidence, it is not the correct test when a court reviews an allegation that false testimony was given at trial.”

(stating requirements for a new trial based on false testimony).

4 Wright’s claims are procedurally barred because he was either aware, or should have been aware, of the concerns about testing at the SPPDCL, but did not request a stay of his direct appeal to investigate a potential claim.1 -42 (Minn. 2002) (noting that Ferguson requested a stay of his appeal to conduct further investigation into a false-testimony claim).

(quotation omitted); see Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, -34 (1970) (stating that “postconviction procedures .

(stating that a postconviction petitioner requesting an evidentiary hearing cannot depend on mere argumentative assertions without factual support).

-13 (Minn. 2009) (holding that the Knaffla bar applied to ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims that were known at the time of the direct appeal); (noting that Ferguson had requested a stay of his appeal to conduct further investigation into false-testimony claims).

uthority supporting his contention that a recanting witness’s out-of-court statements are excluded from consideration under the Larrison test, we apply the test as it is repeatedly described in caselaw: “Under the second Larrison prong, the court is to ask whether the petitioner has demonstrated that evidence “would probably produce an acquittal or a more favorable result.”

at 734 ; -15, 520 (Minn.2012) (remanding for a postconviction evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party affidavits stating that an alleged alternative perpetrator had confessed to committing the crime).