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Wakasugi can satisfy her burden to show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 15 (quotation omitted).

8 -20 (Minn. 1986); Ward v. Emp.

(holding plaintiff must demonstrate “the [employer’s] proffered explanation is unworthy of credence”); (same); -20 (Minn. 1989) (same).

the supreme court described the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which requires a defendant to produce evidence of a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions,” by stating that a district court should “look for evidence presented by the [defendant] that its actions were rela

In Minnesota , an employee can show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanati on i s unworthy of credence.” Sigurdson v. Isanti County , (citation omitted); see also Hanson, d at 373 ( surviving summary judgment under the pretext step includes offering evidence either that “the employer’s stat ed r eason is untrue” or “that an improper reason ‘motivated the discharge

Direct evidence establishes “that the employer’s discrimination was purposeful, intentional or overt,” “such as where an employer announces he will not consider females for positions,” Sigurdson v. Isanti County

A plaintiff may sustain this burden “either directly by pe rsuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” (quotation omitted).

In the second step of McDonnell Douglas, we consider whether the employer produced evidence that the adverse employment action was related to “some legitimate business purpose.”

“The ultimate burden of persuasi on, however, never shifts, resting at all times upon the plaintiff.” n.2 (Minn. 1986).

Appellant “may sustain this burden either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” (quotation omitted).

Sigurdson v. Isanti County , , 720 (Minn. 1986) (quotation omitted); cf. Feges v. Perkins Rests., Inc. , , 711 (Minn. 1992) ("Perkins'[s] proffered reasons for its decision to fire Feges were capable of being exposed as pretext and Feges made a valiant attempt to do so [at trial].").

(citing Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., , 627 (Minn. 1988) ).

For this step to be met, the court need only find that th e record contains “evid ence presented by the employer that its actions were related to some legitimate business purpose.”

7 (2016), unless the prevailing party is a defendant in which case the district court may only award attorney fees if the 12 plaintiff’s claim is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or [is] brought in bad faith,”

(“An obvious reason for enactment of [the attorney fee provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act] was to encourage victims of discrimination to bring suit, particularly where the relief sought is not a large money judgment, and to make legal counsel available in these cases.”); Liess, d at

McDonnell Douglas Framework When direct evidence of discriminatory motive is unavailable, the McDonnell Douglas framework provides a “means by which discriminatory motive may be indirectly inferred.”

An employee may demonstrate pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”

d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986).

The Commissioner also concluded that the prefiled testimony of Reichmann’s expert contained several statements that lacked an “adequate basis.” “An appellate court cannot judge the credibility of a witness or the weight, if any, to be given to testimony.”

See, (adopting federal standard for awarding attorney fees in cases under the Minnesota Human Rights Act to encourage the vindication of victim’s rights, particularly where the relief sought is not a large sum of money, and to make legal counsel available in those cases).

(explaining that the statutory allowance of attorney fees in the Minnesota Human Rights Act “was to encourage victims of discrimination to bring suit, particularly where the relief sought is not a large money judgment, and to make legal counsel available in these cases”); d

See, (describing burdens of proof and production under McDonnell Douglas framework).

the supreme court set forth the standard for awarding attorney fees to a prevailing defendant under the MHRA.

The plaintiff may meet the burden of showing pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that “[a]n appellate court cannot judge the credibility of a witness or the weight, if any, to be given to testimony”).

See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., (“As the result of the substantial similarities existing between Title VII and [the MHRA], we have frequently applied principles which have evolved in the adjudication of claims under the federal act.”); (applying interpretation of federal antidiscrimination law to MHRA because of similarities between statutes).