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“This sovereignty is ‘dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States.’” (quoting Cabazon, 480 U.S. 4 at 207).

However, in Jones, this court concluded that the registration statute was punitive for the purpose of the Cabazon/Stone test (see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); ), which distinguished from the analysis in Boutin (see Jones, d at 9-11; (distinguishing this court’s conclusion in Jones from Boutin)).

Public Law 280 is a federal statute granting Minnesota , among other states, “broad criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over all Indian country within the state, with the exception of Red Lake Reservation.” State v. Stone

(“In Public Law 280, Congress granted Mi nnesota broad criminal .

“The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.” State v. Stone , d 725, 728 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).

See State v. Stone , (“The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.’” (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mis sion Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (1987))).

See State v. Busse , , 82-88 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that state had 14 jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to prosecute White Earth member for offense of driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety); -31 (Minn. 1997) (concluding that state did not have jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to prosecute White Earth members for driving-related offenses that are “civil/regulatory,” not “criminal/prohibitory”).

See Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S. 353 , 365, 121 S. Ct. 2304 , 2313, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) ; In re Civil Commitment of Johnson , , 139 (Minn. 2011) ; State v. Jones , , 4-5 (Minn. 2007) ; State v. Stone , , 728 (Minn. 1997).

The Cabazon/Stone test requires evaluating whether a law’s intent is " ‘generally to prohibit certain conduct,’ ’’ in which case it is *449 criminal/prohibitory, or whether the law " ‘generally permits the conduct at issue,’ subject to regulation,’ ” in which case it is “ 'civil/regulatory.’” (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 , 107 S.Ct.

To ascertain whether a statute is within Public Law 280’s express grant of jurisdiction, courts must determine whether the statute is “criminal/prohibitory” or “civil/regulatory.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209-10, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1088-89 (1987) (quotation marks omitted); (applying the Cabazon test).

After all, “all laws implicate some public policy,” and we can hardly enunciate a rule that says that we know an actionable public-policy violation when we see it, cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 , 84 S.Ct.

The Supreme Court “has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.’ ” (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 , 107 S.Ct.

Based on this background of federal Indian law, whether speeding and failure to provide proof of insurance were criminal or civil/regulatory offenses.

“State court jurisdiction over matters involving Indians is governed by federal statute or case law.”

we considered whether the State had jurisdiction to enforce certain traffic and driving-related laws against members of the White Earth Band for conduct on the reservation.

the supreme court adopted the analytical framework approved by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 , 107 S.Ct.

1083, 1091 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987); R.M.H., d at 58 ; (“[I]t is established that state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.”).

“State court jurisdiction over matters involving Indians is governed by federal statute or case law.”

728 & 728 n. 3 (Minn.1997).

In State v. Stone, the Minnesota Supreme Court made it clear that “[i]n order for a state law to be fully applicable to a reservation under the authority of Public Law 280, it must be a criminal law.” (citing Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208 , 107 S.Ct.

(citing Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., ).

Id., at 58-59 () (internal quotations and citations removed).

the state may not assume jurisdiction.

1083, 1087 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 *762 (1987)