Cited by

See State v. Loge , (“These two alternate concepts are separated by the disjunctive ‘or,’ not ‘and.’ Unlike the use of the word ‘and,’ ‘or’ signifies the distinction between two factual situations.

Because “major participant” and “extreme indifference to human life,” id., are “two alternate concepts” that are “separated by the disjunctive ‘or,’” the plain meaning of the Act requires, with respect to the second prong, “that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the [Act] to be satisfied,”

(“We have long held that in the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.”).

(“[I]n the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature ’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.”).

1(2) (providing that exceptions to defense and indemnification include that an officer or employee was “guilty of malfeasance in office, willful neglect of duty, or bad faith” (emphasis added)); (describing how “two alternate concepts” in a statute were “separated by the disjunctive ‘or,’” which “require[s] that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied”).

17a(a)(1)-(4) (2024) (listing four circumstances demonstrating that a person “poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others” and using the word “or”); State v. Loge , (“[I]n the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.”).

17a(a)(1)-(4) (using the word “or” between factors); (“[I]n the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.”).

Given the use of the disjunctive “or” in this definition, we interpret it to “require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.”

Aberle v. Faribault Fire Dep’t Relief Ass’n, (stating that “[t]he word ‘or’ is a disjunctive and ordinarily refers to different things as alternatives”).

If the Legislature unambiguously uses the word “or,” we read the term “ ‘in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.’ ” ().

1; (“We have long held that in the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order 7 for the statute to be satisfied.”).

(stating that “‘or’ signifies the distinction” between concepts).

1990 Minn. Laws ch. 391, art. 4, § 49; n.5 (Minn. 2000) (stating that non-substantive legislative amendments following an attorney-general interpretation “is evidence of legislative intent to adopt” that interpretation).

at 417 (gross misdemeanor); (felony); Ndikum, d 9 at 818 (gross misdemeanor to potential felony); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994) (felony).1 Warner’s

Id.; see also State v. Loge , Ndikum, d at 820.

(noting that “or” is generally disjunctive); (noting that manner of speaking, independent of content, may 8 trigger disorderly conduct statute); cf. S.L.J., d at 419, n.6 (noting that conduct alone would have warranted di

See State v. Loge , -59 (Minn. 2000) (keeping open bottle of intoxicating liquor in automobile on public highway); State v. Schwartz, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2020 WL 1845250, at *4 (Minn. App. Apr.

See State v. Loge , (concluding that “or” is generally disjunctive).

State v. Loge , , 155 (Minn. 2000) (describing how "two alternate concepts" in a statute were "separated by the disjunctive 'or,' " which "require[s] that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied").

1(e) (emphasis added); see State v. Loge , , 155 (Minn. 2000) (describing how "two alternate concepts" in a statute were "separated by the disjunctive 'or,' " which "require[s] that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied").

See, (“[I]n the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the .

“An analysis of a statute must begin with a careful and close examination of the statutory language.”

Aberle v. Faribault Fire Dep’t Relief Ass'n, 230 Minn. 353, 359 , State v. Croatt, 227 Minn. 185, 191

We have “long held that in the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the [L]egislature’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.” see also Aberle v. Faribault Fire Dept. Relief Ass’n, 230 Minn. 353, 360 , (“The word ‘or’ is a disjunctive and ordinarily refers to different things as alternatives.”).

(stating that the conjunction “or,” in general, “require[s] that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied”); see also Troyer, d at 24 (“ ‘[N]o word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” (quoting