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The state supreme court has likewise stated that “[o]nce a person in custody invokes 6 his Miranda right to counsel, all police interrogation must cease.”

The district court gave similar instructions before S.J.’s mother testified .1 “We presume that jurors follow a judge’s instructions.”

14 follow a judge’s instructions.”

(first citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); and then citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62).

Factors relevant to the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry include: “the defendant’s age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience, ability to comprehend , lack of or adequacy of warnings, length and legality of detenti on, nature of the in terrogation, physical deprivations, and access to counsel and friends.” State v. Miller

Lastly, the state argues that even if Labarge’s statements could be construed as an equivocal request for counsel, Labarge “immediately reengaged with police, which allowed for the interrogation to continue” to support its argument.

See Garibaldi, d at 829; (stating appellate courts should evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine if a waiver is voluntary).

State v. Pendleton , ; -76 (Minn. 1998) (noting that curative instructions informing jury to disregard testimony lessen s prejudicial impact of illicit testimony).

(noting that the standard refers to “a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation”).

12 (Minn. 1998); n.1 (Minn. 1988) (courts presume jurors follow a judge’s instruction.).

(noting that courts assume that jurors follow a judge’s i nstructions at trial).

(noting that the standard refers to “a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation”).

d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998).

“We presume that jurors follow a judge’s instructions.”

(stating that jurors are presumed to follow the district court’s instructions).

–76 (Minn. 1998) (affirming the district court’s denial of a mistrial when it took steps to minimize the prejudicial effect of improper statements by giving a curative instruction).

“We presume that jurors follow a judge’s instructions.”

See, -76 (Minn. 1998) (affirming denial of mistrial motion where district court immediately gave curative instruction to jury following witness’s testimony 5 regarding appellant’s prior criminal acts).

d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998).2 Contrary to Taylor’s assertion, no evidence suggests that the cautionary instructions were confusing to the jury, and Taylor did not object to the instructions at trial.

Because jurors are presumed to follow a district court’s instructions, d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998), this court can presume that the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant threatened to kill J.E., which is a crime of violence as a matter of law.