Cited by

See State v. Kennedy , (noting that providing cautionary instructions “lessened the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the [Spreigl] evidence”).

see State v. DeWald , (“Admission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion of the [district] court.

E vidence that provides this context “bolsters its probative value.”

“[E]vi dence of prior [domestic] conduct between the accused and the alleged victim” may “put the crime charged in the context of [their] relationship,” State 8 v. McCoy, and may bolster its probative value

s admission of evidence did not significantly affect the verdict where the district court “minimized the risk of prejudice by carefully and repeatedly instru cting the jury not to find [the defendant] guilty based on his past conduct”); Bartylla, d at 22 (finding that any potentially unfair prejudice was mitigated by the distri ct court’s cautionary instructions); (reas oning that cautionary instructions lessened the probability of undue prejudice).

“Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant or which places the event in context bolsters its probative value.” State v. Kennedy

“A defendant who claims the [district court] erred in admitting evidence [of the defendant’s prior bad acts] bears the burden of showing the error and any resulting prejudice.”

A limiting instruction to the jury mitigates the potential for unfair prejudice, see State v. Kennedy , and we assume that jurors follow the district court’s instructions

(“Spreigl evidence need not be identical in every way to the charged crime.”); d 593, 603 (Minn. 1993) (noting that consistency of injuries helps demonstrate common 9 modus operandi).

A limiting instruction to the jury mitigates the potential for unfair prejudice, and we assume that the jury follows the district court’s instructions

A limiting instruction to the jury mitigates the potential 7 for unfair prejudice, and we assume that the jury follows the district court’s instructions.

Fardan, d at 320; (reasoning that cautionary instructions concerning Spreigl evidence lessened the probability of undue prejudice).

“Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant or which places the event in context bolsters its probative value.”

(“Admission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion of the [district] court .

5 “When it is unclear whether Spreigl evidence is admissible, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the defendant and the evidence should be excluded.”

d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998) (noting the district court’s “discretion [in] first weighing the evidence” to assess the strength of the state’s case when balancing prejudice and 5 “determining whether the Spreigl evidence should be admitted”), modified by Ness

“The closer the relationship between the events, the greater the relevance or probative value of the evidence and the lesser the likelihood the evidence will be used for an improper purpose.” (citation omitted).

(“We presume a jury follows a court’s cautionary instruction.”); d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that reading two standard cautionary instructions to the jury lessened the probability of undue weight being given to the evidence).

Berry, d at 17; (holding that Spreigl evidence “need not be identical”); Ness, d at 688 (citing Kennedy, d at 391).

ct [him] on the basis of the occurrences on April 1, 2000.” The court also warned the jury that it could not use the 2000 incident to make a finding about Thao’s character or to conclude that he “acted in conformity with such character.” The court’s cautionary instructions, taken as a whole, “lessened the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.”

(“Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant or which places the event in context bolsters its probative value.”).