Cited by

(stating that “inconsistencies and conflicts in some particular area” between state witnesses “are a sign of the fallibility of human perception—not proof that false testimony was given at trial” and that “[t]his is especially true when the testimony goes to the particulars of a traumatic and ext

6.02, subdivision 5(1)(6), states that a juror may be challenged for cause based on the juror’s “[s]tanding as a guardian, ward, attorney, client, employer, employee, landlord, tenant, family member of the defendant, or person alleged to have been injured by the offense, or whose complaint instituted the prosecution.” In Fraga, that “rule 26.02 provides the exclusive grounds to challenge a prospective juror for implied bias.” d at 623.

(holding that, while there were inconsistencies in the sexual assault victim’s testimony, the victim’s 8 testimony was consistent as a whole considering the trauma and stress of the incident).

(concluding that the victim’s testimony about “the particulars of a traumatic and extremely stressful incident .

To prevail on a claim of juror bias on appeal, a party must show that “the challenged juror was subject to challenge for cause, that actual prejudice resulted from the failure to dismiss, and that appropriate objection was made by appellant.” d 314, 317 (Minn. 1983).

To prevail on a claim of juror bias on appeal, the appellant must demonstrate that “the challenged juror was subject to challenge for cause, that actual prejudice resulted from the failure to dismiss, and that appropriate objection was made by appellant.”

As the supreme court has stated, “[t]his court has recognized that inconsistencies and conflicts in some particular area between one state witness and another does not constitute false testimony nor any basis for reversal.”

Collins argues that the district court erred when it failed to strike Juror C sua sponte for bias after Collins’s trial counsel failed to challenge Juror C. The state argues that under State v. Stufflebean , Collins was required to challenge Juror C for bias in district court to preserve the issue on appeal.

d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006) (stating that a jury is free to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony); (explaining that inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony do not necessarily indicate falsehood but the “fallibility of human perception,” particularly when the witness is describing “ the particulars of a traumatic and extremel y stressful incident ” (quotation omitted) ).

14; see, (affirming defendant’s conviction of fourth -degree criminal sexual conduct, holding that 8 the element of force or coercion was established by evidence that complainant awoke, with part of her clothing removed, and with defendant “lying partially nude on top of her”); see also State v. Carter

Inconsistencies “are a sign of the fallibility of human percep tion—not proof that false testimony was given at trial.” (quoting State v. Hanson , 286 Minn. 317, 355, ).

Inconsistencies and conflicts “are a sign of the fallibility of human perception—not proof that false testimony was given at trial.” (quoting State v. Hanson, 286 Minn. 317, 355, ).

d 314, 319 (Minn. 1983).

State v. Stufflebean , (quotation omitted).

But although a curative instruction would have been appropriate, because defense counsel did not request such an instruction, we evaluate the misconduct “to determine whether it was so serious that the [district] court should have intervened sua sponte to keep the argument within permissible bounds.” d 314, 318 (Minn. 1983).

(stating that inconsistencies between 9 testimony of state’s witnesses “do not constitute false testimony nor any basis for reversal”).

the supreme court stated that an appellant making a biased-juror argument “must show [1] that the challenged juror was subject to challenge for cause, [2] that actual prejudice resulted from the failure to dismiss,1 and [3] that appropriate objection was made by appellant.” Id.

(holding that inconsistent testimony does not require reversal especially in the case of “a traumatic and extremely stressful incident” where human perception is more likely to be flawed).

“Minor inconsistencies in a complainant’s testimony, or between her testimony and previous statements, do not deprive a verdict of sufficient support if the complainant’s testimony, taken as a whole, is consistent and credible.” (noting that inconsistent testimony may be “a sign of the fallibility of human perception not proof that false testimony was given at trial,” especially “when the testimony goes to the particulars of a traumatic and extremely stressful incident”).

(), *87 review denied (Minn. Feb.

(requiring a showing of actual prejudice); but see Logan, d at 324 (noting that improper juror selection criteria or the seating of a biased juror undermines the process and is not amenable to harmless-error review).

Nonetheless, this court held substantially similar language to be “technically improper” but not warranting reversal.

see also Atkinson v. Mock, 271 Minn. 393, 397 , (recognizing that Minn.Stat.