Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818.

201 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
In the context of traffic stops, “if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
A traffic stop is supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion “if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no ma tter how insignificant the traffic law.”
Cole Gilbert McGuire, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The stop cannot be “the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
“[T]o justify such an investigatory stop, the police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
A17-0564 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
However, “if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
6 An investigatory stop is justified if it “was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotations omitted); (stating that reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific, articulable facts” that permit the officer to articulate his “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activi ty”).
Paul Robert Mix, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
An investigatory stop is justified if it “was not th e product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Anderson , (quotat ions omitted).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
(noting that a 6 traffic violation, no matter how insignificant, generally provides such a basis).
State of Minnesota v. Mary Lynn Boline Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Catherine Nyree McCabe 890 N.W.2d 173 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Catherine Nyree McCabe 890 N.W.2d 173 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
An officer may “conduct a limited investigatory stop of a motorist if the state can show that the officer had a 3 particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” –23 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Mary Lynn Boline Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Gregory Walter Bakke Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Gregory Walter Bakke Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Rather, an investigatory stop is valid if it “was not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Devin Keith Barner Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Devin Keith Barner Minn. Ct. App. 2016
DECISION The pretrial ruling had a critical impact “When the state appeals a pretrial order, it must show clearly and unequivocally (1) that the ruling was erroneous and (2) that the order will have a ‘critical impact’ on its ability to prosecute the case.” ( ); see also Minn. R. Crim.
State of Minnesota v. Creighton Thomas Penn Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Creighton Thomas Penn Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Theron Dean Ibarra Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Theron Dean Ibarra Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Robert David Stoneburner v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Robert David Stoneburner v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
But a police officer is permitted to make a limited investigatory stop of a motor vehicle if the officer has a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” -23 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Michael John Frank v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Michael John Frank v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
A police officer may conduct a limited investigatory stop of a motor vehicle if the officer has a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” -23 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
James David Clark v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
James David Clark v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
To justify an investigatory traffic stop, “the police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon 5 specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Robert Carl Thoensen Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Robert Carl Thoensen Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Christine Marie Tomlinson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (A15-1424), and State of Minnesota, (A15-1431) v. Christine Marie Tomlinson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Christine Marie Tomlinson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (A15-1424), and State of Minnesota, (A15-1431) v. Christine Marie Tomlinson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Roger William Kuehn v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Roger William Kuehn v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Justin Glenn Joecks Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Justin Glenn Joecks Minn. Ct. App. 2016
See Minn. Stat. § 171.24 (2014) (defining crimes of driving without a valid driver’s license); (“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”).
State of Minnesota v. Christopher Gary Zurek Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Christopher Gary Zurek Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“In general, the state and federal constitutions allow an officer to conduct a limited investigatory stop of a motorist if the state can show that the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” -23 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. George Edward Wilson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. George Edward Wilson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(holding “that an officer’s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized and objective basis for 5 suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop”); (vacating con
State of Minnesota v. Paul Joseph Hager Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Paul Joseph Hager Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“In general, the state and federal constitutions allow an officer to conduct a limited investigatory stop of a motorist if the state can show that the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” -23 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Melissa Jill Thompson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Melissa Jill Thompson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
While the reasonable suspicion standard is not high, an officer’s suspicion must not be the product of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”
State of Minnesota v. Tyler Thomas Devries Morse Minn. Ct. App. 2015