Cited by

See, (stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s actions in a probable-cause analysis is “an objective inquiry” and the “actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness” (quotation omitted)); (stating that, when determining the validity of a traffic stop, decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court “and the United States Supreme Court focus not on the subjective belief of the officer, but rather on the objective basis for the belief that the defendant w

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

“[A] limited investigatory stop of a motorist” is constitutionally permissible “if the state can show that the officer had 3 a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” -23 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

“[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

(“Minnesota Statutes § 169.18, subd.

Police may lawfully initiate a traffic stop when they have “a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” - 23 (Minn. 2004) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

an investigatory stop, the police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotations omitted).

d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004).

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson

(holding that “an officer ’s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop”).

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” see also State v. Poehler , (“When an officer observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.”).

-23 (Minn. 2004); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).

Generally, observing a violation of a traffic law, “no matter how insignificant ,” forms “the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

(permitting a police officer to make a brief investigatory stop when the officer observes even an “insignificant” violat ion of traffic law ).

(Minn. 5 Second, Bachman’s argument fails on the merits.

“When an officer observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.” Id.

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

Police may lawfully initiate a traffic stop when they have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” -23 (Minn. 2004) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

“[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.”

State v. Anderson , -23 (Minn. 2004).

see also George , d at 579 (holding that the stop of a motorcyclist based on a state trooper’s mistaken understanding that the headlight configuration on the motorcycle was illegal was not reasonabl e because “[t]here was no objective basis in the law for the trooper to reasonably suspe

“Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observati on forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson

d 818, 822–23 (Minn. 2004) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690 (1981)).

See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020) (stating that courts must apply statute’ s plain 6 meaning if its language is clear and unambiguous); d 818, 821 (Minn. 2004) (instructing courts to interpret statutory language according to its plain meaning if it is clear and unambiguous and not resort to other principles of statutory construction).

that observation forms the requisite particul arized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson , see, (upholding traffic stop when driver failed to wear a seatbelt); Kruse v. Comm’r of Pub.

“Gene rally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite 4 particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson

d 818, 821 (Minn. 2004).