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“An error in instructing the jury is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.”

at 688 (quotation omitted)

A jury-instruction error “is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the 6 instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Watkins, d at 28 ().

I Evidence of other bad acts, also known as Spreigl evidence, is “generally not admissible to prove the defendant’s character for committing crimes.” (); see also Minn. R. Evid.

Spreigl evidence is evidence of a prior bad act and “ is generally not admissible to prove the defendant ’s character for committing crimes, but it can be admitted to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or plan.” State v. Gomez , ( (Mi nn.

Prior bad act evidence satisfies the fourth requirement of the Spreigl exception “when there is a sufficiently close relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in terms of time, place, or modus operandi.”

“A defendant’s substantial rights are affected when ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the giving of the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.’ ” Ezeka, d at 407 ().

d 871, 879 (Minn. 2006) (stating that in balancing probative value and potential prejudice, the district court should consider the state’s “need for the evidence” (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted)).

d 871, 881 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that the appellant failed to show an error was prejudicial when it was “unlikely that the jury would have reached a different verdict”).

He relies on the supreme court’s holding that the district court errs if it gives a no-adverse- inference instruction without a defendant’s “clear consent and insistence,” (quotation omitted).

affected his substantial rights because the instruction afforded the jury the ability to convict him as an accomplice in the absence of evidence or argument supporting such a conviction.2 A plain error affects a defendant’s substantial rights when “there is a reasonable likelihood that the giving of the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.”

had a signi ficant effect on the jury verdict.” State v. Gomez

A defendant’s substantial rights are affected if “there is a reasonable likelihood that [the admission of evidence] in question had a significant eff ect on the jury verdict.” State v. Gomez

When a defendant chooses not to testify, a no -adverse- inference instruction may be given “only if the defendant requests the court to do so.”

5 When a defendant chooses not to testify, a no -adverse-inference instruction may only be given “if the defendant requests the court to do so.” d 871, 880 (Minn. 2006).

If a ppellant satisfies all three requirements, we consider whether a new trial is necessary “to ensure the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.”

An erroneous jury instruction affects a defendant’s substantial rights if “ ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.’ ” ().

An erroneous jury instruction “is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.”

(holding that error affecting substantial rights requires reasonable likelihood that jury instruction significantly affects jury’s verdict); d 228, 231 (Minn. 1988) (concluding “ no reasonable likelihood that the jury somehow discredited the victim’s testimony

The practice of requiring a defendant’s consent before giving such an instruction complies with the comment to CRIMJIG 3.17, which states that “[ i]f such an instruction is requested by the defendant, the judge should also require the defendant to state on the record the desire to have such an instruction given.” CRIMJIG 3.17, cmt.; see State v. Gomez , d 871, 880 (Minn. 2006) (“If the defendant requests the instruction, the court or the defendant’s counsel must make a record of the defendant’s

(“Because the record does not contain [the defendant’s] consent to the giving of the no -adverse-inference instruction, .

15 Gomez, (quotation omitted).

See State v. Gomez , , 880 (Minn. 2 006) (stating that a n erroneous no - adverse-inference instruction is harmless without a showing of prejudice ).

State v. Gomez , , 880 (Minn. 2006) (emphasis added).

A. Relevance and Materiality “Spreigl evidence is relevant and material when there is a sufficiently close relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in terms of time, place, or modus operandi.”

A jury instruction error is prejudicial if the defen dant carries her “heavy burden” and shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.” ().

Plain error does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights when, “[g]iven the totality of the evidence, it seems unlikely that the jury would have reached a different verdict.”

The burden of persuasion on the third element is on the defendant, and it is a “heavy burden [to] show[ ] that there is a reasonable likelihood that the giving of the instruction would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” -82 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

See also State v. Gomez , -80 (Minn. 2006) (holding that prior crimes evidence was properly admitted to prove identity because, “[i]n each case, the victims were elderly, the victim s were physically assaulted in their homes, and the victims’ wallets or purses were taken or money was demanded”).

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing 8 court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (quotation omitted).