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But a district court should exclude ultimate-issue testimony if it “embraces legal conclusions or terms of art” or “merely tell[s] the jury what result to reach.” (quotations omitted).

“Other serious bodily harm” is not defined by statute but must “be taken in the context of the other three alternative definitions.”

A district court may exclude ultimate-issue testimony if it “embraces legal conclusions or terms of art” or “merely tell[s] the jury what result to reach.” (quotations omitted).

(stating, in the context of first-degree assault, that whether an injury constitutes great bodily harm is a question for the fact-finder).

Other Serious Bodily Harm Ibrahim argues that his plea does not establish that he inflicted “other serious bodily harm.” “Other serious bodily harm” is not defined by statute, and “should be taken in the context of the other three alternative definitions.”

Christensen contends that the “including but not limited to” language in subdivision 2(a)(4) “must be construed as restricting those unarticulated responses to those similar to those expressly listed in the statute.” in which the supreme court interpreted the statutory definition of “great bodily harm” in the assault statute, which consisted of three specific types of serious bodily harm and, in addition, the catch-all provision “other serious bodily harm.” Id.

8 (2022); (inserting numerals to identify alternative means of proof).

The state does not cite, and we are not aware of, any precedential authority holding that a temporary loss of consciousness constitutes great bodily harm for the purpose of first-degree assault.2 Other Serious Bodily Harm “Other serious bodily harm” is not defined by statute, and it “should be taken in the context of the other three alternative definitions.”

“The question of whether a particular injury 8 constitutes great bodily harm is a question for the jury.”

8 (2018); (inserting four numerals to identify four alternative definitions).

(stating the same principle regarding great bodily harm).

State v. Moore , (quotation omitted).

8 (2018); see also State v. Moore , (adding numerals to identify four alternative definitions).

See State v. Moore , d 733, 737 (Minn. 2005) (holding that whether an injury constitu tes great bodily harm is a question for the jury).

A district court may exclude ultimate-issue testimony if it “embraces legal conclusions or terms of art ” or “merely tell[s] the jury what result to reach.” (quotations omitted).

8; (inserting four numerals to identify four alternative definitions).

(holding that erroneous jury instruction that deprived defendant of right to have jury decide existence of all offense elements was not subject to harmless-error review).

(holding that the question of whether an injury constitutes great bodily harm is a question for the jury) .

While the adequacy of jury instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, “[w]hether a criminal defendant has been denied the right to a jury trial is a constitutional question that we review de novo.” -49 (Minn. 2011).

The district court may also exclude testimony on the ultimate issue “when the tes timony would merely tell the jury what result to reach.” (quotation omitted).

Appellant argues that State v. Moore , controls here.

ppeals, arguing that he “only agreed that the jury would hear evidence that he stipulated that he was ineligible.” He argues that he never waived his right to a jury trial on the issue of his ineligibility and that the mandatory instruction on that element therefore violated his “right to have the jury determine that every element of the cha rged offense has been established.”

He relies on State v. Moore , d 733 (Minn. 2005).

State v. Moore , , 740 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

“The district court has considerable latitude in selecting language for jury instructions.”

in which a doctor testified that the loss of a tooth met the definition of “great bodily harm.” Id.

The right recognized in Gaudin was vindicated in State v. Moore

nnesota Supreme Court examined whether a district court removed an element of the offe nse from the jury’s considera tion when the district court defined “great bodily harm,” a required elemen t of first-degree assault, as including a permanent loss of the function of a part of the body, and then informed the jury that “loss of a tooth is a permanent loss of the function of a bodily member.” 8 (Minn. 2005).

“Minnesota’s rules of evidence permit expert opinion testimony on ultimate issues if such testimony is helpful to the factfinder.”

A jury instruction is erroneous “if it materially misstates the law.”

See State v. Moore, 9 (holding that reversal is required and harmless -error analysis is inapplicable when a jury instruction deprives a defendant of his right to have the jury determine that the st ate established every element of the charged offense).

“The question of whether a particular injury constitutes great bodily harm is a question for the jury” and “[w]hether [a victim’s] injuries constituted great bodily harm [i]s a question within the knowledge and 9 experience of the jury.” 740 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

See State v. Moore , (holding that reversal is required and harmless -error 15 analysis is inapplicable when a jury instruction “deprives the defendant of the right to have the jury determine that every element of the charged offense has been established”).