Cited by

-93 (Minn. App. 2003) (concluding district court did not abuse its discretion based on the length of a sentence imposed in granting a downward durational departure), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

See, -93 (Minn. App. 2003) (rejecting the state’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by departing from a presumptive 150-month prison term to a 75-month prison term for second-degree murder after concluding the crime was significantly less serious because “Martinson had a mental illness before, d

We have considered, and find unconvincing, his attempt to liken his circumstance to those addressed in State v. Martinson , rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

-92 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

In terms of offense-related factors, a district court may consider, among other things, “whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” (qu otation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

Offense-related factors focus on the proportionality of the sentence to the severity of the offense, meaning “whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

(affirming a downward durational departure when record contained “uncontroverted [evidence] that, at all relevant times, [appellant] suffered from the psychosis of paranoid schizophrenia.”), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

6 Third, appellant’s rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

Guidelines 2.D.203.3.a(3) (2018)

(granting a downward duration al departure where defendant suffered from “the psychosis of paranoid schizophrenia ”); State v. Barsness , (affirming downward durational departure where defendant was suffering from major depression at the time of the off

Citing two cases for the proposition that severe mental illness is a mitigating factor that supports a sentencing departure— review denied (Minn. Jan.

(affirming downward durational departure when defendant experienced psychotic symptoms), review denied (Minn. Jan.

Hodge argues that this court has foun d “extreme mental impairment” based on similar levels of cognitive impairment, citing State v. Martinson , (M inn.

t 15 that deprived him of “control over his actions.” (stating that “in order to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions” (); see also State v. Martinson , review denied (Minn. Jan.

-92 (Minn. App. 2003) This case is more analogous to McLaughlin than Martinson.

Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(3) (2014); see State v. 5 Martinson, , 892 (Minn. App. 2003) (affirming downward durational departure based on mental impairment that affected the defendant’s actions at the time of the offense), review denied (Minn. Jan.

-92 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Jan.

“Mental impairment that causes an offender to lack substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed will support a downward departure.” State v. Martinson , review denied (Minn. Jan.

review denied (Minn. Jan.

See, (“[T]o constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.”); -92 (Minn. App. 2003) (affirming a downward durational departure for a defendant who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and concluding that his mental impairment was sufficiently extreme to be a substantial and compelling circumstance that justified the departure), review denied (Minn. Jan.

891-92 (Minn.App.2003), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.

See, e.g., Spain, d at 89 (reducing a triple upward departure to the double upward departure that "[a]s a general rule, [is] the maximum upward departure in sentence length''); cf, , 891 (Minn.App.2003) (affirming downward dura-tional departure, 75 of 150 months (), to determine that “this court generally will not interfere with the exercise of [district court] discretion”).