Cited by

-60 (Minn. 2005); -35 (Minn. 1999) (providing that state’s duty to disclose and present evidence is limited to material evidence relevant to case and necessary to ensure fair trial).

(citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).

(holding that the state must disclose relevant or exculpatory evidence to the defense).

“Evidence is material ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

“Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” d 452, 460 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

2 “[A] defendant’s conviction generally will not be reversed under Brady or Rule 9.01 unless the defendant also shows that the state’s violation prejudiced his defense.” (describing prejudice as one of the elements of a successful Brady claim); 2 Although Manila did not refer to Rule 9.03 in his brief or to the district court, we may consider its application because we have a responsibility “to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is no

We “review a postconviction court ’s determinations of legal issues de novo.”

“A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (quotation omitted).

Third, prejudice to the accused must have resulted.” Pederson v. State , (citations omitted).

Cf. Pederson v. State , (determining that the materiality prong of the Brady-violation test, which asks whether the absence of the evidence caused prejudice to the defendant, involves a mixed issue of law and fact that requires de novo review).

It is improper for a prosecutor to suppress exculpatory or impeaching evidence, or to “allow[] false testimony to go uncorrected.” 461 (Minn. 2005).

1(6) (providing that the prosecution must disclose “[m]aterial or information in the prosecutor’s possession and control that tends to negate or reduce the defendant’s guilt”); (stating that rule 9.01 embodies the first two components of the test for alleged Brady violations).

Pederson v. State , (stating that rule 9.01 embodies the first two components of the test for alleged Brady 6 violations).

The state has a duty to disclose any evidence it 9 possesses or controls that “tends to negate or reduce the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged.”

Pederson v. State , , 459 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263 , 281-82, 119 S.Ct.

-60 (Minn. 2005) (The three elements of a Brady violation are: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant; (2) the evidence was “suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently;” and (3) prejudice to the accused resulted.).

Three components are necessary for a “true Brady violation.” Pederson v. State , (M inn.

(citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 , 119 S.Ct.

See Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196 -97 (stating that suppression of exculpatory evidence by the state is a due -process violation, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the pros ecution); Pederson v. State , 11 (Minn. 2005).

On appeal, we will “overturn a postconviction court’s decision only when we find an abuse of discretion, and we will consider only whether sufficient evidence supports the postconviction court’s conclusions.”

Third, prejudice to the accused must have resulted.” (citations omitted).

There are “three components necessary for a ‘true Brady violation.’” (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999)).