Cited by

d 272, 281 (Minn. 2006).

While analyzing the statements in Portillo, the supreme court distinguished the prosecutor’s

A fact-finder may infer intent “from the totality of the circumstances.” ().

The state argues that the prosecutor’s

The supreme court distinguished the prosecutor’s

See, (strength); (frequency); (acquittals).

The State, in contrast, contends that the prosecutor did not misstate the law; rather, the State argues that the prosecutor’s statement during rebuttal was consistent with the pattern jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and equivalent to prior closing-argument statements regarding the presumption of innocence that our court has approved in the past

d 272, 284 (Minn. 2006) .

See State v. Young , , 279 n.1 (Minn. 2006).

See State v. Young , (stating that Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd.

(stating that identification evidence 5 may be admissible if totality of circumstance s establishes reliability of evidence, even if identification procedure was unn ecessarily suggestive).

Second - degree murder with intent requires proof that one “either had a purpose to kill [the victim] or believed that his actions, if successful, would kill .” State v. Young

(stating that identification evidence ma y be admissible if totality of circumstances establishes reliability of evidence, even if identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive).

The state’s closing argument “must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence .” (emphasis added).

Generally, “[w]hen reviewing sufficiency of evidence, [an appellate court] inquire[s] whether, given the facts in the record and any legitimate 5 inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that even 4 if procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, identification evidence may be admissible if totality of circumstances establishes that evidence was reliable).

-79 (Minn.2006) (explaining that a jury may infer a person’s intent to kill from the nature of the killing).

But “parties are permitted to argue reasonable inferences from the facts presented at trial.” (quotation omitted).

Parties are allowed to “argue reasonable inferences from the facts presented at trial.”

Mayhorn, d at 786 (discussing number of references to improperly admitted evidence as affecting the analysis of the impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct); Caron, 300 Minn. at 128, d at 200 (discussing the 7 strength of the state’s other evidence); (discussing instructions given to the jury).

“Plain error is considered prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotations omitted).

“A jury may infer a person's intent to kill from the nature of the killing.” (); (noting that intent can be inferred where the gun was fired at the victim at close range).

(reasoning that jury’s acquittal on one count indicated that evidence was not prejudicial).

-79 (Minn. 2006) (stating that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of first-degree felony murder because the principal had the intent to cause the death of the victim, and the defendant satisfied the state-of- mind requirements for accomplice liability in Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.

(stating that an error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that it had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict).