Cited by

The language of a statute is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

is usually proved by circumstantial evidence.” (d 616, 617 (Minn. 1984) ) (other citation omitted), aff’d, (“We have long held that the proof of knowledge may be made by circumstantial evidence.” ( (Gallagher, Frank T., J., concurring specially) (noting that, although knowledge must be proved to sustain the conviction at issue, “the jury [could] f

“The terms content and character refer to the nature of the pornographic work, the definition of which requires that individuals depicted in the work are minors.” (quotations omitted).

(holding that remand was appropriate because we could not be certain that the district court would have made the same findings of fact had it applied the correct legal standard).

In Spann, the supreme court reasoned that, in prior cases in which district courts “misapplied the intent element in a bench trial,” the supreme court “reversed the conviction and remanded to the district court to reconsider its verdict on the existing record.” d at 216 ( ).

antial evidence is insufficient to show that he knew or had reason to know that the photographs were “pornographic work s.” Under section 617.247, subdivision 4, “a possessor of child pornography has ‘reason to know’ that a pornographic work involves a minor whe[n] the possessor is subjectively aware of a ‘ substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that the work involves a minor.”

A statute’s language is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

The language of a statute is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

t is a crime to disseminate or possess child pornography “knowing or with reason to know its content and character.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “a possessor of child pornography has ‘reason to know’ that a pornographic work involves a minor where the possessor is subjectively aware of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that the work involves a minor.”

The language of a statute is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

See State v. Mauer , (proof of knowledge may be based on circumstantial evidence).

(addressing a First Amendment challenge to a child pornography statute).

4(a), a possessor of child pornography has ‘reason to know’ that a pornographic work involves a minor where the possessor is subjectively aware of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that the work involves a minor.”

The language of a statute is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

(citing State v. Mauer , , 111 (Minn. 2007) ).

Cf. State v. Mauer , , 116 (Minn. 2007) (remanding to the district court "[b]ecause we cannot be certain that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law would support [the defendant's] conviction under our narrowing construction of 'reason to know ...'

(interpreting Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd.

See State v. Mauer , , 111 (Minn. 2007).

State v. Mauer , , 111 (Minn. 2007).

4(a), which means that the individual “is subjectively aware of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that the work involves a minor, ”

Knowledge of the content and character of the files includes either actual know ledge or a subjective awareness “of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the work involves a minor.” (quotation omitted).

See, e.g., Rasmussen, d at 799

“An ambiguity exists only where a statute’s language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”