Cited by

Crow next claims that the jury instructions at his trial relieved the state of its burden of proof on some elements of a crime, citing State v. Mahkuk , , 682-83 (Minn. 2007).

6 presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” d at 805 ().

State v. Mahkuk , , 682 (Minn. 2007).

State v. Mahkuk , , 689-90 (Minn. 2007).

(stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial after i t sustained the defense’s objection and gave a curative instruction).

the s upreme court has held that the element of “intentionally aiding” includes “two important and necessary princi ples: (1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” ().

Proving that Holt intentionally aided Parker required the state to establish two elements: the first is that Holt knew that Parker was “going to commit a crime” (in this case selling cocaine) and the second is that he “intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.”

Even if a jury instruction is erroneous, it does not merit a new trial if the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The intent element of aiding and abetting “embodies two important and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotation omitted); (stating that aiding and abetting first -degree murder requires proof that the defendant “knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime and .

knew the other person was going to commit ...(emphasis added)); Kelley, d at 283 (requiring the state to prove the defendant “knew his friend was going to commit the robbery” (emphasis added)); (requiring the state to prove that the defendant knew his alleged accomplices “were going to commit a crime” (emphasis added)); (requiring proof that the defendant “knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)).

Though erroneous, a jury instruction does not merit a new trial if the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(stating that whether the state’s witness’s “violation of the [district] court’s order” prohibiting the witness from testifying about a gang’s possession of firearms “was intentional or not,” the witness’s “reference to firearms during his testimony” was “extremely troubling” and constituted “mis

Our review of jury instructions is controlled by the abuse of discretion standard because we have previously recognized the importance of allowing district courts “considerable latitude in choosing jury instructions.”

See State v. Mahkuk , (concluding that whether the stat e’s witness’s “violation of the trial court’s order” prohibiting the witness from testifying about a gang’s possession of firearms “was interchangeably); State v. Simion , (same); Stat

(concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mahkuk’s mistrial motion because inadmissible evidence was brief).

-83 (Minn. 2007) (finding error when the hybrid jury instructions “allowed the jury to find [the defendant] guilty if it found that [he] was intentionally present at the scene of the crime without also finding that it was [his] in tent that his presence aid or encourage the commission of the crime” and that a

- 20 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial based on an isolated incident where the state introduced evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of another shooting that occurred the same 7 night as the murder with which he was charged); (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial when the defendant was able to identify only one isolated incident comprised of two w

d 675, 680-81 (Minn. 2007).

(stating that appellate courts review district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion).

-20 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial based on an isolated incident where the State introduced evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of another shooting that occurred the same night as the murder with which he was charged); (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a mistrial when the defendant was able to identify only one isolated incident comprised of two word

ANALYSIS I. Mistrial motion “A mistrial should not be granted unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different if the event that prompted the motion had not occurred.” (quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, we concluded that our reasoning in an earlier case, -83 (Minn. 2007), required such an instruction.

2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that “element of ‘intentionally aiding’ embodies two important and necessary 5 principles: (1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime’”) (

721 , 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010); witness testimony, Bobo, d at 139 ; -85 (Minn. 2007); closing arguments, jury instructions, Brown, d at 616-18; and returning of the verdict.

(stating that state must prove knowledge of crime and intention to further crime to prove accomplice liability).

A defendant’s presence intentionally aids another in committing a crime when: (1) the defendant knew that his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime; and (2) the defendant “intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.”