Cited by

(“Based on the record, we cannot determine whether [the witness’s] violation of the trial court’s order was intentional or not; nonetheless, it was misconduct attributable to the prosecutor.”); (noting the state must prepare its witnesse

The supreme court has stated that, in order to prove aiding and abetting under subdivision 1, “the State has to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the crime and ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” State v. Clark , ().

d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007).

r for a prosecutor to ask questions that are calculated to elicit or insinuate an inadmissible and highly prejudicial answer.” (quotation omitted) (holding the prosecutor committed misconduct when asking a question that elicited evidence when there was an understanding that said evidence would not be placed at issue); (holding that a prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting a response from a testifying officer about firearms when the district court had limited the scope of the officer’s test

At the time of his plea, for Owens to be guilty as an accomplice he had to admit that he “knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime and that [he] intended his presence or actions to further the commission of the crime.” see Segura, d at 158 (discussing evidence required to support conviction of aiding and abetting attempted premeditated murder).

“The ‘intentionally aids’ element requires that the defendant ‘knew that [her] alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime’ and that the defendant ‘intended [her] presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” d 812, 815 (Minn. 2024) (d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007)).

The phrase “intentionally aids” requires “(1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” ().

(explaining that appellate courts “will not reverse a [district] court’s decision on jury instructions unless the [district] court abused its discretion” and that “[a]n instruction is error if it materially misstates the law” (quotation omitted)).

The “intentionally aids” element requires that the defendant “knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime” and that the defendant “intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Mahkuk

d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007).

See State v. Mahkuk , (noting that the element of intentionally aiding requires that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were 12 going to commit a crime, and that the defendant intended his pre sence or actions to further the commission of that crime ).

“[T]he element of ‘intentionally aiding’ embodies two important and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant ‘knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,’ and (2) that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” ().

Id.; (“We review a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.”); (“We will not reverse a trial court’s decision on jury instructions unless the trial court abused its discretion.”) However, a district court abuses its discretion when its jury instructions confuse or mislead the jury, or materially misstate the law.

The “intentionally aids” element requires that the defendant “knew that [her] alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime” and that the defendant “intended [her] presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007); see Minn. Stat. § 609.05.

-85 (Minn. 2007) (conducting de novo review of the record to determine whether the Waller standard was met).

(reversing the closure of a courtroom in the absence of evidence of actual threat to a witness’s privacy or safety); (reversing the closure of a courtroom in the absence of “a showing that closure was necessary to protect the witness or ensure fairn

2 See State v. Mahkuk , (rejecting the protection of witnesses as an overriding state interest in the absence of any witness having been intimidated or threatened).

(“We caution, however, that if we were to conclude that violation of the trial court’s order was intentional, the appropriate remedy might well be reversal even having concluded that the misconduct was not prejudicial.”).

-85 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted) (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1984)).

To impose liability for aiding and abetting a crime, the state must prove that Naidu “knew [her] alleged accomplices were going to co mmit a crime and that [she] intended [her] presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Mahkuk

se accomplice-liability instructions “must explain to the jury that in order to find a defendant guilty as an accomplice, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” ().

Appellant relies on State v. Mahkuk , , for legal support.

8 (Minn. 2012) (d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007)).

District courts are given “consid erable latitude” in selecting jury instruction language, and we ordinarily review for abuse of that discretion, d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007).

d at 839 ; State v. Mahkuk , , 689 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that the issuance of curative instructions rather than granting a mistrial was a proper use of discretion).

tionally elicits inadmissible evidence from a state’s witness, a new trial may be appropriate if the inadmissible evidence was prejudicial in the sense that it “played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” See State v. McDaniel , (quotation omitted) ; see also State v. McNeil , -32 (Minn. App. 2003); cf. State v. Mahkuk , -90 (Minn. 2007) (cautioning that reversal may be appropriate re medy for intentionally eliciting inadmissible evidence even if not prejudicial).

“We will not reverse a [district] court’s decision on jury instructions unless the [ district] court abused its discretion.”

An erroneous jury instruction does not merit a new trial if the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pollard, d at 181 ().

If a prosecutor intentionally elicits inadmissible evidence from a state’s witness, reversal of a conviction is appropriate if the inadmissible evidence was prejudicial in the sense that it “played [a] substantial part in convincing the jury of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.; -32 (Minn. App. 2003); cf. State v. Mahkuk , -90 (Mi nn.

d 675, 683 (Minn. 2007).