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The clear and convincing standard “is met when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable.” d 686, 701 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

“An indictment carries with it a presumption of regularity.”

Under the first step, the reasonableness of Hussein’s attorney’s performance, “[o]bjective reasonableness requires that counsel exercise the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

“A defendant is prejudiced by an evidentiary ruling when there is a reasonable possibility that without the error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.” (quotations omitted); (“An error is prejudicial if the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” (quotation omitted)).

The clear-and-convincing standard “is met when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable.” (quotation omitted).

“A defendant is prejudiced by an evidentiary ruling when there is a reasonable possibility that without the error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.” (quotations omitted).

“We will reverse evidentiary rulings only 12 if the district court clearly abused its discretion and the defendant was thereby prejudiced.” (quotation omitted).

“A defendant is prejudiced by an evidentiary ruling when there is a reasonable possibility that without the 10 error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.” (quotation omitted).

“The defendant has the burden to establish both that the district court abused its discretion and that the error was prejudicial.”

“A defendant is prejudiced by an evidentiary ruling when there is a reasonable possibility that without the error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.” (quotation omitted); see also Peltier, d at 802 (“[A]n appellant who alleges an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (q

An erroneous evidentiary ruling is prejudicial when “there is a reasonable possibility that without the error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.” (quotation omitted).

The supreme court has concluded that Rule 9.01 “requires the State to disclose the substance of every oral statement by a witness that relates to the case, even if the witness does not disclose new or different information from previously disclosed statements.” (d 476, 490 (Minn. 2005) ).

The clear and convincing “standard is met when the truth 4 of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable.” (quotation omitted).

There is a strong presumption that an attorney’s “performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

There is a strong presumption that an attorney’s “performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance.”

The state must “disclose all exculpatory evidence, including impeachment evidence.” (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)); see also Minn. R. Crim.

“[T] he eviden ce must clearly show the person’ s direct pa rticipation in the other crime.” State v. Miller , (quotation omitted) .

“When challenging an indictment, the de fendant bears a heavy burden and only in rare cases will an indictment be invalidated.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation ma rks omitted).

See State v. Miller , , 707 (Minn. 2008) (concluding that because a witness was already impeached at trial, evidence of a plea agreement would not have resulted in a more favorable jury verdict).

(concluding that, despite the state’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence, the defendant was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure when the wi tness was otherwise “successfully impeached at trial”).

A. Clear-and-convincing evidence “The clear and convincing standard requ ires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotati on omitted).

Presuming, but not deciding, that there was a failure to disclose the statement to th e grand jury, such a fa ilure requires dismissal of the indictment only “if the evidence woul d have materially affected the grand jury proceeding.” State v. Miller , (quotation omitted).

Determining the terms of a plea agreement is a factual inquiry, “but interpretation and enforcement of agreements involving issues of law are reviewed de novo.”

(explaining that “the court must still evaluate [the alternative perpetrator] evidence under the ordinary evidentiary rules as it would any other exculpatory evidence” (quoting Jones, d at 16 ))

“A new trial is warranted when the State’s discovery violations viewed in the light of the whole record, appear[] to be inexcusable and so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was denied.” (quotation omitted).

3 (stating that a discovery violation did not prejudice the defendant when the prosecutor “followed his office’s usual practice for obtaining criminal history records”).

Clear and convincing evidence “requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted).

Prejudice occurs “when there is a reasonable possibility that without the error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.” (quotation omitted).

After meeting this threshold requirement, the defendant must meet three additional requirements before introducing evidence of other bad acts committed by the alternative perpetrator, which is commonly referred to as “reverse-Spreigl evidence.”