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And “in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” see Sammons v. Sammons , (stating that the “district court may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonparty” and “[lacked] personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment affecting [the property rights of a nonparty]”)

See, d 335, 339 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that “[a] constructive trust is a ‘judicially created equitable remedy imposed to prevent unjust enrichment of a person holding property under a duty to convey it or use it for a specific purpose.’” (d 484, 485 (Minn. 1981)).

Danielson v. 7 Danielson

Co., (“[W]hen parties reduce their agreement to writing, parol evidence is ordinarily inadmissible to vary, contradict, or alter the written agreement.” (quotation omitted)).

(stating that, “in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights”); (stating that the “district court may not exercise jurisdiction over a non

agree with City Center that the amendment was a fully integrated contract , separate from the lease.5 When “parties have reduced their agreement to an unambiguous integrated writing,” courts cannot interpret that written agreement by relying on extrinsic evidence, including “extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior written agreements.” ( ).

“[O]nly if a deed is ambiguous can evidence other than its language be considered to determine its meaning.”

538, 539 (Minn. 1939) (“One not a party, or in privity with a party, is not bound by a judgment.”); (stating that “in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights”).

And generally, “in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” see 7 (stating that the “district court may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonparty” and “[lacked] personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment affecting [the property rights of a nonparty]”)

Expert Mechanical was not a party to the dissolution proceedi ng, and a district c ourt “lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.”

9 We conclude that, viewing th e evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s 9 “[I]n a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” d 335, 339 (Minn. App. 2006) ; (noting that section 518.58 “does not authorize th e district court to adjudicate t he interests of third parties”).

(“[I]n a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.”); see also Blohm v. Kelly , (“Corporate assets do not belong to the stockholders, but to the corporation.”

Further, where the language of a real estate instrument is unambiguous, a district court “err[s] as a matter of law by admitting and considering evidence to dete rmine the meaning of the [instrument].” (stating that “w hen parties reduce their agreement to writing, parol evidence is ordinarily inadmissible to vary, contradict, or alter the written agreement.”) Because there is an unambiguous, integrated written contract between the parties governing the assignment of rights, the district

“[W]hen parties reduce their agreemen t to writing, parol evidence is ordinarily inadmissible to vary, contradict, or alter the written agreement.” (concluding that, “[b]ecause the language of the deed [was] unambiguous, the distri ct court erred as a matter of law by admitting and considering evidence to determine the meaning of the deed”); see also Minn. Stat. § 336.2- 202 (2018) (limiting the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence).

See Danielson v. Danielson , (recognizing that “in a dissolution proceeding, a district cour t lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights”); (noting that statutory authority providing for division of marital propert

In Danielson v. Danielson , we recognized that “in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” see also Fraser v. Fraser , (noting that statutory authority providing for division of marital property in a marriage dissolution action “does not authorize the district court to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” (noting that Minn. Stat § 518.58 (2000) “does not authorize the district cou rt to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

Nafstad v. Merchant , 303 Minn. 569, 571, 22 (rules for construing contracts apply to options); Danielson v. Danielson , (rules for construing contracts apply to deeds).

We have held that the district court erred when it “awarded to [a] nonparty an interest in property that, on its face, was marital property,” and we have concluded that, “in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.”

§ 507.06 (2010) (“A deed of quitclaim and release shall be sufficient to pass all the estate which the grantor could convey by a deed of bargain and sale.”); -39 (Minn.App.2006) (rejecting a claim that a quitclaim-deed grantor intended to retain an ownership interest in the property conveyed).

The district court granted summary judgment after determining that the alleged oral agreement between Maday and respondents “is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.” “The parol-evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but a substantive rule of contract interpretation.”