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The court of appeals, rejected Yang’s argument and affirmed.

14 But prosecutors are permitted to use “dramatic devices” and argue in a “persuasive fashion” to “make reasonable inferences from the record.” d 538, 552 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

However, “prosecutors are not prohibited from arguing that certain witnesses are 10 believable.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

-66 (Minn. App. 2009) (concluding prosecutor’s comments explaining victim’s age, inexperience, and shame were not an attempt to inflame jury passions, but an explanation of evidence on “why [the victim] did not immediately report the sexual assault”), aff’d, (“Prosecutors are permitted to make reasonable inferences from evidence on the record, to analyze or explain the evidence, and to make legitimate arguments to the jury based on the evidence.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

We so hold based on State v. Rucker, 8 rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

This court has held that, “for the purpose of establishing venue in the limited area of child -abuse, a child can be ‘found’ in the county where the child resided either when the abuse occurred or when the abuse was discovered.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

In response, rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

A prosecutor has the flexibility “to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences that the jury must draw from it.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

And Andersen did not provide separate defenses with respect to each threat; (considering the nature of the appellant’s defense at trial in determining whether a specific unanimity instruction was required), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

Second, Yang’s a rgument relies almost entirely on our holding in Stempf, but Stempf is distinguishable from the facts of Yang’s rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

Particularly in sexual abuse cases, which “inevitably evoke an emotional reaction” and “where credibility is the central issue,” any attempt “to exacerbate this natural reaction by making any emotive appeal to the jury is likely to be highly prejudicial.” (quotation marks omitted); rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

14, 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

-49 (Minn. App. 2008), the state did not need to prove specific dates, so long as it proved the abuse occurred within a reasonable amount of time.

at 358 (noting two distinct defenses to the separate allegations of controlled-substance possession); (concluding that the district court was not required to provide a unanimity instruction where appellant’s defense to multiple charges of criminal sexual conduct stemming from dozens of acts was consistent across all the acts), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

As such, “specific dates need not be proved in cases charging criminal sexual conduct over an extended period of time.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

In State v. Rucker, we concluded that “specific dates need not be proved in cases charging criminal sexual conduct over an extended period of time.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

See State v. Rucker , d 538, 548 (Minn. App. 2008) (noting that the defendant did not present separate defen ses for each incident of alleged sexual abuse, rather he maintained that the abuse did not occur), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

“[T]he circumstances in which a person is in a position of authority are not limited to the examples of ‘position of authority’” in that definition, and “[t]his court has held that ‘position of authority’ is broadly defined under 14 this statute.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

d 538 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

“[T]he circumstances in which a person is in a position of authority are not limited to the examples of ‘position of authority’ described in section 609.341, subdivision 10.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

14, 1994); rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

” State v. Rucker , rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

14, 1994); d 538, 547 (Minn. App. 2008) (holding that “a child can be ‘found’ in the county where the child resided either when the abuse occurred or when the abuse was discove red”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

d 3, 4 (Minn. 1980) (uncle cared for his niece); (defendant co-facilitated an after-school program that the victim attended), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

14, 1994); (holding that for the purpose of establishing venue in the limited area of child abuse, a child can be “found” in the county where the child resided either when the abuse occurred or when the abuse was discovered), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

20, 1988) (same); -49 (Minn. App. 2008) (holding jury verdict was not unfair when there was insufficient evidence of some alleged acts and the charged crime did not entitle defendant to know the specifically alleged acts for which he was convicted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

Prosecutorial error is plain if it is “clear or obvious.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

But “[p]rosecutors are permitted to make reasonable inferences from evidence on the record, to analyze or explain the evidence, and to make legitimate arguments to the jury based on the evidence.” rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

A prosecutor’s argument that complainants testified to “the truth” with “frankness and [] sincerity” was not impermissible vouching because these statements “were used in the context of reviewing the evidence and urging the jury to find [the complainants] credible.” -53 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. 8 Sept.

rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

A prosecutor is permitted “to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence” and “to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” - 53 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

548 (Minn. A pp. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept.

“[T]he circumstances in which a person is in a position of authority are not limited to the examples of ‘position of authority’ described in section 609.341, subdivision 10.” review denied (Minn. Sept.

d 538, 547-49 (Minn. App. 2008) (affirming co nvictions of first-degree and second-degree 9 criminal sexual conduct with respect to each of two different victims), review denied (Minn. Sept.

(distinguishing case from Stempf because, among other things, appellant did not present separate defenses and “simply maintained throughout his trial that he [did not commit the crime]”), review denied (Minn. Sept.

” State v. Rucker , , 552 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept.

“The court looks at the closing argument as a whole when c onsidering claims of prosecutorial misconduct.” State v. Rucker , review denied (Minn. Sept.

We have previously held that “for the purpose of establishing venue in the limited area of child-abuse, a child can be ‘found’ in the co unty where the child resided either when the abuse occurred or when the abuse was discovered.”

“But a jury need not agree unanimously with respect to the alternative means or ways in which a crime can be committed.” State v. Rucker , review denied (Minn. Sept.

In sexual abuse cases in particular, prosecutors “must abide by the highest behavior.” review denied (Minn. Sept.

“But prosecutors are not prohibited from arguing that certain witnesses are believable.” State v. Rucker , review denied (Minn. Sept.

State v. Rucker , -48 (Minn. App. 2008) (“Generally, sp ecific dates need not be prove d in cases charging criminal sexual conduct over an extended period of time.”), review denied (Minn. Sept.

“A prosecutor is not required to make a colorless closing argument.” review denied (Minn. Sept.

(stating that evidence of prior criminal - sexual-conduct conviction was probat ive to the criminal -sexual-conduct victims’ credibility when their conduct “may have called into question their credibility, weakening the state’s case”), review denied (Minn. Sept.