Cited by

b. Potential Prejudice to Defendant “Joinder is not appropriate when there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant, which can be shown by demonstrating that codefendants presented ‘antagonistic defenses.’” State v. Martin

See State v. Martin , ( stating that because j udgment of conviction was not entered for a crime committed for the benefit of a gang and defendant was not sentenced for that offense, “the issue of whether the re was sufficient evidence to convict him on that count is moot.”).

(“Prosecutors improperly shift the burden of proof when they imply that a defendant has the burden of proving his innocence.”).

(stating that “ a family member’s involvement with the legal system is a legitimate race-neutral reason” for a peremptory strike).

" Schuette v. City of Hutchinson , , 238 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Martin , , 98 (Minn. 2009) ).

“We afford great deference becaus e the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the [district] court may consider.” (quotation omitted ).

" d at 121 (quoting State v. Martin , , 98 (Minn. 2009) ).

Zumberge, d at 696; (failure to admit video evidence was harmless in part because it was “largely redundant”).

State v. Martin , , 106 (Minn. 2009).

This explanation “need not be persuasive or even plau sible.”

See State v. Martin , , 98 (Minn. 2009) ("We require a compelling reason before a prior decision will be overruled."

See State v. Martin , (stating that a “ prosecutor has the right to fairly meet the arguments of the defendant”).

“A prosecutor may [also] argue that there is no merit to a particular defense.”

Peremptory strikes allow parties to strike potential jurors they believe will be less fair than others.

Prosecutors also have “the right to fa irly meet the arguments of the defendant.”

Further, a “prosecutor has the right to fairly meet the arguments of the defendant.”

(a plain error only “affects a defendant’s substantial rights” when “there is a reasonable probability that the erro r actually impacted the verdict .”).

d 799, 808 (Minn. 2013) (noting the focus of the state’s case and the evidence when viewed in context); -45 (Minn. 2012) (noting the probative value of evidence introduced to anticipate challenges to witness credibility); (noting the probative value of the evidence); (notin g the context of the evidence and the overall weight of evidence against the defendant); 5 (Minn. 2009) (noting the scope of the state’s questions); (noti ng witness credibility); McArthur, d at

While this co urt may overrule its own precede nt if there is a compelling reason to do so, State v. Martin , we cannot overrule supreme court precedent and are bound by its decisions.

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor “expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’s credibility.” (quotation omitted); (concluding that prosecution impermissi bly vouched for credibility of w itness when it said that state “believed” witness was “believable”).

(reviewing the grant of a joinder motion for an abuse of discretion where the d efendant objected); (same).

The doctrine of stare de-cisis has special force in the area of statutory interpretation because the Legislature is free to alter what we have done.” ()).

The state’s “misstatement of the burden of proof is highly improper and constitutes misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

This conclusion is consistent with our doctrine of stare decisis, our obligation to promote stability in the law and the integrity of the judicial process, and our reluctance to overrule our precedent absent a “compelling reason,” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), as well as our statutory authority, Minn. Stat. § 204B.44.

-03 (Minn. 2009) (“Our case law under Batson is well established .

(stating framework for Batson challenge).

Misstating the burden of proof constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, yet a “legitimate explanation of the [s]tate’s burden is proper.” –14 (Minn. 2011) (holding no plain error when prosecutor’s explanation of burden of proof, read in context, was not improper).