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We are “extremely reluctant to overrule our precedent” and will do so only for “compelling reason[s].” ().

See McDaniel, d at 752 (“[A] prosecutor can argue that a particular defense has no merit.”); (“A prosecutor may argue that there is no merit to a particular defense.”).

“A prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof is highly improper and constitutes misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

[and] to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.” (quotation omitted).

She went through those sensory details with you.” Thus, the prosecutor’s statements properly discuss “the credibility of witnesses in the context of the evidence before the court and the conclusions that can be drawn from that evidence.” Fields, d at 786; see also State v. Martin , - 07 (Minn. 2009 ) (“We conclude that although the first statement was vulgar, none of these statements constituted vouching for the witness’s credibility.

(concluding appellant failed to establish prejudice from sequestration violation, in part, because defense had opportunity to question witness about sequestration violation).

8 most fair.” (quotation omitted).

During closing argument, a prosecutor may argue whether a witness is credible but “must not personally endorse a witness’s credibility.”

For these reasons, prosecutors must refrain from conduct such as endorsing a witness’s credibility, d 89, 106 (Minn. 2009), attempting to bring inadmissible evidence to the attention of the jury, “inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant,” (quotation omitted), and discussing facts not in evide

24, 1986); (citing Erdman, d at 334).

“A prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof is highly improper and constitutes misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

“While a prosecutor must not personally endorse a witness’s credibility, the [s]tate may, in closing argument, argue that a witness was or was not credible.”

“The prosecutor has the right to fairly meet the arguments of the defendant.”

or expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’ s credibility.” (quotation omitted).

A prosecutor commits misconduct by “impl[ying] a guarantee of a witness’s truthfulness” or “express[ing] a personal opinion as to a witness’s credibility.” d 89, 106 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).

It is misconduct when a prosecutor “implies a guarantee of a witness’s truthfulness” or “expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’s credibility.”

A party may use a peremptory challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons 5 they believe will be most fair.” (quotation omitted).

Under that test, in cases involving “unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct,” we determine “whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

5 will be less fair than some others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.” (quotation omitted).

A party may use a peremptory challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.” (quotation omitted).

A party may use a peremptory challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.” (quotation omitted).

This is so because “[w]e are extremely reluctant to overrule our precedent absent ‘a compelling reason.’ ” ().

“Peremptory challenges allow a party to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some others and, by this process, to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.” (quotation omitted).

and will only do so for “a compelling reason.” (quotation omitted).

“A prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof is ‘highly improper’ and constitutes misconduct.” ().

But “[a] prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof is highly improper and constitutes misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

“The prosecutor has the right to fairly meet the arguments of the defendant.”

“A prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of 17 proof is highly improper and constitutes misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

7(3); accord State v. Martin , (citations omitted).

v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. at 1719 ; State v. Martin , .

See, (“Martin has failed to establish prejudice under a harmless-error analysis.

It was instead a point-to -point rebuttal to the contentions of Hirsi’s counsel and, as such, it was the prosecutor exercising his “right to fairly meet the arguments of the defendant.”