Cited by

(quotation omitted); (“A lawyer’s performance is deficient if he represents a client despite having a conflict of interest.”).

Criminal defendants have the right to assistance of counsel, and “[t]his right includes a fair opportunity to secure counsel of [their] own choice.”

“The right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.”

“A conflict of interest exists if ‘there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by 23 the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client , a former client or a third person , or by a personal interest of the lawyer.’” (quoting Minn. R. Prof.

(explaining that a district court must ascertain how a defendant wishes to proceed following discharge of counsel and then determine whether the defendant may proceed as requested).

The right to effective assistance of counsel includes a “correlative right” to conflict-free counsel, Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981), and a defendant can establish the deficient performance prong of Strickland by demonstrating that counsel had a conflict of interest, .

“A lawyer’s performance is deficient if he represents a client despite havi ng a conflict of interest.”

d 27, 32 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Aug.

A defendant cannot demand a continuance for the purpose of delay or by “arbitrarily choosing to substitute counsel at the time of trial.” ().

Fry argues that his case is like State v. Paige, in which this court reasoned that a district court should ask a defendant how he wishes to proceed when he wants to discharge his attorney, and that the district court erred 20 when it “took no action to clarify appellant’s request to discharge counsel.” d 134, 140 (Minn. App. 2009).

(concluding that district court erred by failing to determine how defendant wished to proceed after discharging counsel and remanding “to clarify and address [defendant’s] request to discharge counsel”).

Appellant also relies on State v. Paige , , for the proposition that the district court should have asked how appellant intended to proceed pro se .

“[W]hen an attorney informs the district court of a probable risk of conflict, and the court fails to take adequate steps to ascertain whether an impermissible conflict exists , the defendant’s conviction mu s t b e r e v e r s e d w i t h o u t inquiry into prejudice resulting from the alleged conflict.” -41 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).

See State v. Paige , (remanding to district court with instructions to allow appellant to renew plea -withdrawal request after court resolves his request to discharge counsel based on ineffective assistance).

to support his argument that the district court erred by failing to appoint substitute 8 counsel.

The court bears “the responsibility to clarify and address a defendant’s request to discharge counsel.”

If a defendant establishes a conflict of interest, prejudice is “generally presumed.”

“[W]hen a criminal defendant makes a request to discharge counsel, the district court is required to first ascertain how the defendant wishes to proceed after counsel is discharged, and then determine whether it is appropriate for the defendant to proceed as requested.”

“A lawyer’s performance is deficient if he represents a client despite having a conflict of interest.” (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271-72, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1103-04 (1981)); see also Minn. R. Prof.

Instead, a district court may terminate a self-represented litigant if he “deliberately engage[s] in serious and obstructionist misconduct,” “abuse[s] the dignity of the courtroom,” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, or where self-representation unduly delays or disrupts trial, -40 (Minn. App. 2009).

For purposes of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel, “[a] lawyer’s performance is deficient if he represents a client despite having a conflict of interest.”

“A lawyer’s performance is deficient if he represents a client despite having a conflict of interest.”

- 141 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that “a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that defense counsel actively represented conflicting interests and [that] this conflict adversely affected the lawyer’s performance,” but that where a defendant makes the district court aware of a probable conf

“A lawyer’s performance is deficient if he represents a client despite having a conflict of interest.”

Finally, to argue that the district court should have rescheduled the plea-withdrawal hearing to permit Taylor to retain a different lawyer.

(using definition provided by rules of professional conduct to determine whether trial attorney had a conflict that violated defendant’s constitutional right to counsel).