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The prosecutor may not admit prior bad-acts evidence, known as Spreigl evidence, see State v. Riddley , , 424 (Minn. 2009), unless (1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent consistent with the rules of criminal procedure, (2) the prosecutor clearly indicates what the evidence will be offered to prove, (3) the other act and the individual's participation in it is proven by clear and convincing evidence, (4) the evide

“Minnesota has long adhered to the common -law rule excluding evidence of prior bad acts except where the evidence fits within a specific exception.” ; see also Minn. R. Evid.

“A defendant appealing the admission of evidence has the burden to show the admission was both errone ous and prejudicial.” State v. Riddley , d 419, 424 (Minn. 2009).

And appellate courts “presume a jury follows a [district] court’s cautionary instruction.”

See, e.g., Fardan, d C/D-5 at 320 (affirming after erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence due, in part, to the manner in which it was presented); State v. Riddley , (noting that other-crime evidence “was not graphi c or inflammatory,” which made it less prejudicial); State v. Clark , -48 (M inn.

“A defendant appealing the admission of evidence has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.”

any error i n admitting evidence of prior convictions was not prejudicial when defense counsel did not draw attention to the fact that one felony was unspecified and two were specified, the state did not specifically inquire about the prior convictions during cross-examination or refer to them in closing argument, and the district court gave a limiting instruction); see also State v. Ridley , (stating that a jury is presumed to follow a court’s cautionary instruction).

n.3 (Minn. 2009) (requiring a close causal and temporal connection between the prior bad act and the charged crime), and that no such connection has been proved in appellant’s case.

See State v. Riddley , d 419, 424-27 (Minn. 2009); State v. Wofford , 262 Minn. 112, 118

“Immediate-episode evidence is a narrow exception to the general character evidence rule.”

“A defendant appealing the admission of evidence has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.” d 419, 424 (Minn. 2009).

potential for unfair prejudice when it admitted the relationship evidence, the district court was careful to take the necessary step to ensure that the jury would not use the evidence for an impermissible purpose by giving a cautionary instruction, d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009) (“We presume a jury follows a court’s cautionary instruction.”).

Fifth Amendment An appellant contesting the admission of evidence “has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.”

(stating that courts “presume a jury follows a court’s cautionary instruction”); Kennedy, d at 392 (reasoning that cautionary instructions concerning Spreigl evidence lessened probability of undue prejudice).

(“We presume a jury follows a court’s cautionary instruction.”); d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that reading two standard cautionary instructions to the jury lessened the probability of undue weight being given to the evidence).

Evidence of other offenses may also be admissible where that evidence “tend[s] to establish any of the elements of the offense with which the accused is charged, even though such facts and circumstances may prove or tend to prove that the defendant committed other crimes.” (quotation omitted).

“Other relevant considerations are whether the State dwelled on the evidence in closing argument and whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.”

(alteration in original) (citations omitted).

See United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 913 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that “where the evidence of an act and the evidence 8 of the crime charged are inextricably intertwined, the act is not extrinsic and Rule 404(b) is not implicated”); -26 (Minn. 2009) (discussing how, in the context of Minn. R. Evid.

An appellant contesting the admission of evidence “has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.”

(“We presume a jury follows a court’s cautionary instruction.”); (concluding that a district court’s reading of two standard cautionary instructions to the jury lessened the probability of undue weight being given to the evidence).

-30 (Minn. 2009) (upholding dismissal of juror for cause when juror’s brother had been shot by police officer and prosecutor was also the prosecutor in a case against juror’s son).

But “[i]mmediate-episode evidence is a narrow exception to the general character evidence rule.”

“A defendant appealing the admission of evidence has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.”