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The supreme court has stated that the doctrine of transferred intent “allows evidence of an intent to harm ‘someone’ to transfer to the person actually harmed.” d 497, 507 (Minn. 2009).

“When determining whether a photographic lineup was unnecessarily suggestive, we inquire whether the procedure used by the police influenced the witness identification of the defendant.” (quotation omitted).

-02, 509-10 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence to establish intent to kill with no indication that the defendant knew the identity of the victims).

The doctrine of transferred intent, which is incorporated into the first-degree murder statute, provides “that a defendant may be convicted if it is proved [that they] intended to injure one person but actually harmed another.” (quotations omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (criminalizing “caus[ing] the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another” (emphasis added)).

See Rhoades, d at 137-38; (noting that, appellate courts review the imposition of multiple and consecutive sentences when multiple victims are involved under the abuse-of-discretion standard, and multiple sentences will be upheld so long as they do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the conduct); State v. Vang, 84

A. In criminal law, the doctrine of transferred intent “allows evidence of an intent to harm ‘someone’ to transfer to the person actually harmed when there is a possibility the victim was not the intended recipient of the specific act.”

incorporate the doctrine of transferred intent.”

see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2020) (defining murder in the first degree for causing the death of a person with premeditation and intent to cause the death “of the person or another” (emphasis added)).

See, (stating that “we have upheld similar 4 sentences” and then concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing multiple sentences); (“Whether consecutive sentencing over exaggerates criminality is determined by this court

See State v. Cruz-Ramirez , d 497, 512 (Minn. 2009).

at 915; see also State v. Cruz-Ramirez , (“[T]ransferred intent allow s evidence of an intent to harm ‘someone’ to transfer to the pers on actually harmed when 2 Appellant’s counsel objected, say ing that the state had an opp ortunity to request this instruction earlier and that, because th

State v. Cruz-Ramirez , , 506 (Minn. 2009).

incorporate the doctrine of transferred intent.” (concluding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s intent to kill victim, reasoning in part that first-degree premeditated-murder statute “incorporate[d] the traditional doctrine of ‘transferred intent’”).

that is generally proven circumstantially “by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” (stating that it may be inferred “that a person intends the natural and probable 8 consequences of his actions”); (“Intent [to murder] may be inferred from the manner of the killing.”); (stating that “[i]ntent to cause the result of [victim]’s death could be inferred from the nature and extent of the [stab] wounds and the fact that defendant left

The state agrees that those convictions should be vacated, but notes that “the underlying jury verdicts of guilty [on the unsentenced convictions] must remain intact.” (“The State does not object to vacating the [unsentenced] convictions, but asks us to note that the underlying guilty verdicts remain in force.”); -24 (Minn. 2005) (“[T]he state agrees [with the defendant that seven of his ten convictions based on the same conduc

Although “[i]ntent may be inferred from the manner of the killing,” there is no evidence of Johnson’s knowledge as to the protective vest’s coverage.

“The verdict will not be overturned if the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

We review jury instructions “in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law.”

an occupied building” is guilty of a felony); , 507-08 n. 3 (Minn.2009) (noting that “the elements of drive-by shooting ...

(stating that when multiple victims are involved, multiple and consecutive sentences are allowed).