Cited by

“Particular cruelty involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” (quotation omitted).

d 339, 356 (Minn. 2008) (stating that fleeing crime scene evidences “consciousness of guilt”); (stating that failure to aid may be relevant in determining whether person convicted of a crime acted with particular cruelty).

bused its discretion because the district court improperly sentenced Hinton to an upward durational departure based on “dismissed and uncharged conduct disputed by [Hinton].” “An upward departure will be reversed if the sentencing court’s articulated reasons for the departure are improper or inadequate and the evidence in the record is insufficient to justify the departure.” (quotations omitted).

6 presumptive guidelines sentencing range only if there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a sentence outside the range on the grids.” (quotation omitted).

is of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” (quotation omitted); (stating that an offense is particularly serious when it involves “gratuitous cruelty which was unjustified within the context of the crime”).

An appellate court may identify a typical case by rel ying on its “collective experience” in reviewing numerous criminal appeals, see, or by making comparisons to similar cases, see

“[A] district court may depart from the presumptive guidelines sentencing range only if there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a sentence outside the range on the grids.” (quotation omitted) .

- 88 (Minn. 2011) (stating that failure to provide medical aid on its own is not a sufficient basis for departure).

“[P]articular cruelty involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” (quotations omitted) .

-86 (Minn. 2011); -08 (Minn. 2014).

In this context, the term “particular cruelty” me ans “the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” (quotations omitted).

The purpose of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is to “promote uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” d 583, 586 (Minn. 2011).

The “district court may depart from the presumptive guidelines sentencing range only if there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a sentence outside the range on the grids.” Tucker v. State , (quotation omitted).

The “district court may depart from the presumptive guidelines sentencing range only if there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to s upport a sentence outside the range on the grids.” Tucker v. State , (quotation omitted).

“Particular cruelty involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” Tucker v. State , (quotation omitted).

The “district court may depart from the presumptive guidelines sentencing range only if there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a sentence outside the range on the grids.” (quotation omitted).

Tucker v. State , Minn. Sent.

“Substantial and compelling” circumstances are those that demonstrate “that the defendant’s conduct in the offense of conviction was significantly more or less serious than that typical ly involved in the commission of the crime in question.” (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).

“Particular cruelty involves the gratuitous infliction of pain 7 and cruelty of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” (quotation omitted).

(explaining the “fundamental requirement” that upward departures are permitted “only when a defendant’s conduct in the commission of an offense is significantly more- serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense in question”).

” Tucker v. State , (quotation omitted).

Second, particular cruelty is an appropriate aggravating factor if the cruelty is “of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” (quotation omitted).

“Particular cruelty involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” (quotations omitted).

Guidelines II.D.3.b.(2) (2012); –87 (Minn. 2011).

“Generally, [appellate courts] review an upward departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion.” −86 (Minn. 2011).

See Hicks, d at 162 n.7 (noting that the “[l]egislature has apparently limited the impact of Jackson”); n.1 (Minn. 2011) (Anderson, J., concurring) (noting that the legislature “statutorily overruled the restriction adopted in Jackson” when it promulgated section 244.10, subdivision 5a(b)).

Moreover, this definition of “aggravating factor” is consistent with our case law, see, and Minn. Sent.

The goal of the sentencing guidelines is to “promote uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.”