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“Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are generally analyzed as trial errors under Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” (quotation omitted).

15 “[W]hen different words are used in the same context, we assume that the words have different meanings.”

Concepts, (“A contract must be interpreted in a way that gives all of its provisions meaning.”); (applying this principle in the context of interpreting court rules and stating “when different words are used in the same context, we assume that the words have different meanings”).

“The interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure is a question of law that we review de novo.”

It is true that “ when different words are used in the same context, we assume that the words have different meanings .”

4 (2022).6 Citing the general rule that “when different words are used in the same context, [ this court ] assume[s] that the words have different meanings,” , mother asserts “household” means a “shared living quarter” while “home” refers to a “social unit.”7 Here, because the statute defines neither the word “home” nor “household,” we may look to dictionary definitions to determine the common and ordinary meanings.

“We interpret court rules in accordance with the rules of grammar and give words and phrases their common and approved usage.” Dereje v. State , ().

723 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that counsel’s decision to stipulate to the admi ssion of the complaint and police reports, and agreement not to present witnesses, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or provide closing argument did not result in structural error); Dalbec, d at 628 (concluding

Campbell contends that his attorn ey entirely failed to challenge the state’s case and was therefore ineffective.

d 714, 721 (Minn. 2013).

“A stipulated fact is [an] agreement between opposing parties regarding the actual event or circumstance.” (concluding that the parties did not conduct a court trial based on stipulated facts but instead had a proper court trial b ased on stipulated exhibits).

See Dereje v. State , ( indicating that “when different words are used in t he same context, we assume that the words have different meanings”).

-24 (Minn. 2013) (holding that defense counsel did not commit structural error by stipulating to submission of particular evidence with defendant’s consent).

Dereje v. State , , 720 (Minn. 2013) (noting that we assume that when different words are used in the same context, the words have different meanings).

Dereje v. State , , 720 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Hohenwald , , 829 (Minn. 2012) ).

Dereje v. State , (quotation omitte d ) .

In any event, Winston cannot satisfy the second requirement of an ineffectiveness claim, which requires a petitioner to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; see also Dereje v. State

“ The interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure is a question of law that [this court] review[s] de novo.”

(analyzing Minn. R. Crim.

We interpret court rules in accordance with the rules of grammar and give words and phrases their common and approved usage.” (quotation and citation omitted).

The problem with this analysis is that first-degree burglary is defined differently than second-degree burglary, and our precedent holds that " 'when different words are used in the same context, we assume that the words have different meanings' " State v. Nelson , , 439 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Dereje v. State , , 720 (Minn. 2013) ) (citing Transp.