Cited by

(quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243 (2011)).

In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s order, applied to the search of Douglas’s vehicle.

876 (Minn. 2015) (holding that the “exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures” does not apply “when law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent”).

See, e.g. , (recognizing that 2008 and 2009 supreme court opinion s were abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013)); (recognizing that 1998 supreme court opinion was abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)).

at 572, 575 (quotation omitted); (declining to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence where exclusion “deters no police misconduct and imposes substantial social costs”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has similarly stated that “the exclusionary rule in Minnesota, like the federal exclusionary rule, does not require automatic suppression of evidence obtained by unlawful means,” and has “identified deterrence of police misconduct 19 as the central purpose of the exclusionary rule.” -72 (Minn. 2015).

(citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011)).

The question presented is whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the Minnesota Constitution, –77 (Minn. 2015), should apply to evidence obtained during a search and arrest incident to a quashed warrant that appears active to law enforcement because of a clerical court error.

3 In the alternative, if the court determines that probable cause was lacking.

Appellant argues on appeal that the “flaw in the district court’s logic starts with its singular analysis of Lindquist, and ends with its erroneous conclusion that every violation of the Fourth Amendment automatically requires application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy.”

excused” the “failure to bring what would have otherwise been a futile argument.” -68 (Minn. 2015); (“A claim becomes ripe when there is an intervening change in the law between a party’s initial decision not to raise the claim because it would have been futile under then-existing law, and a later decision

(adopting good-faith exception for circumstances when law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding 13 appellate precedent).

Rasmussen v. Tahash , ); , 866 -67 (Minn. 2015) (stating that defendant may forfeit constitutional errors if defendant fails to object timely).

-69 (Minn. 2015) (“Although the Court has noted other purposes of the exclusionary rule, deterring police miscondu ct has become its touchstone.”); see also Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 236, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (“The [exclusionary] rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter fut

In arguing that the evidence was properly admitted, the State asserts a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule

Th e Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted only a narrow good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied when “law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellant precedent.” 876 (Minn. 2015).

Hoeft v. Hennepin C ounty

See 15 State v. Lindquist , (“The exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or Article I, Section 10, of the Min nesota Constitution, when law enforcement acts in good -faith, objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent.”).

The court in Lindquist noted the “narrowness of [its] holding.” Id.

If a search is conducted without a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement, the district court will suppress evidence under the exclusionary rule, which functions “as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.” see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S. Ct. 613, 619 (1974) (noting that under the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure”).

See State v. Lindquist , (holding that the “exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constituti on, or Article I, Section 10, o f the Minnesota 2 Our remand for reconsideration of the voluntariness of appellant’s consent is no indicat

State v. Lindquist , -69 (Minn. 2015).

(concluding the “exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Con stitution, or Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution when law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appe llate precedent”).

–77 (Minn. 2015) (noting the “narrowness” of the binding-appellate-precedent exception and declining to decide whether Leon should apply in Minnesota courts).

See State v. Lindquist , , 873 (Minn. 2015) ("The right to a remedy for wrongs is '[a] fundamental concept of our legal system and a right guaranteed by our state constitution.'

See State v. Lindquist , , 876 (Minn. 2015) (adopting good-faith exception to exclusionary rule when law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent but noting that "nothing in our opinion should be construed as authorizing the application of exceptions we have not explicitly adopted").

Citing State v. Lindquist , t he state argues that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.

State v. Lindquist , (declining to suppress evidence from a search “conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent”).

See State v. Lindquist , (“Application of the exclusionary rule is therefore unwarranted when exclusion does not result in appreciable deterrence.” (quotation omitted )).