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14 erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

Under that standard, a postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling 14 on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A district 5 court abuses its discretion if it “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts review the district court’s “legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016).4 As noted above, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Batson “articulated a three-step process for courts to follow in assessing whether a peremptory strike runs afoul of equal protection principles.” (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98)

A district court abuses its discretion if it “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts review the district court’s “legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.”

Hendrickson forfeited these claims, as he “alludes” to several issues, but “fails to address them in the argument portion of his brief.” n.1 (Minn. 1998); d 779, 784 n.4 (Minn. 2016) (concluding ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised in petition for postconviction relief but not addressed in appellate brief was forfeited).

6 conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016).

In doing so, we review the district court’s “legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.”

Although doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing are resolved in favor of the petitioner, “a postconviction evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.”

“The legal standard required to obtain an evidentiary hearing is lower than that required for a new trial.” (quotations omitted) .

Rhodes v. State , (concluding that allegations in the petition “must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support” ( citation omitted)).

(concluding that alle gations in the petition “must be more than argumentative assertions withou t factual support” (quotation omitted)).

ourts to set a hearing on the petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” An evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition is required “where there are material facts in dispute that were not resolved at trial and must be resolved to rule on the merits of the issues raised.”

When a petitioner seeks relief more than two years af ter the claim arose, a distri ct court “does not abuse its discretion when it summarily denies the petition.”

“[A] postconviction evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.” Rhodes v. Stat e, (citations omitted).

But a “hearing is not required when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.”

d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016).

ts to hold a hearing on the petition “[u]nless the petition and 14 the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” An evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition is required “when there are material facts in dispute that were not resolved at trial and must be resolved to rule on the merits of the issues raised.”

n.3 (Minn. 2020); Rhodes v. State , n. 3 (Minn. 2016).

1 In his postconviction petiti on, Shelby asked the postconv iction court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not valid.

A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision “on an erroneous view of the law, or made cle arly erroneous factual findings.” (quotation omitted).

To satisfy the actual -innocence criterion, the “proffered evidence must be unequivocal, intrinsically probable, and free from frailties.”

Rhodes v. State , , 786 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Brown v. State , , 786 (Minn. 2015) ).

Rhodes v. State , , 787 (Minn. 2016) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

7 Rhodes v. State , , 788 (Minn. 2016).

See Rhodes 6 v. State , (stating that “[t]he clear -and-convincing- innocence requirement in [Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

Although we review the denial of an evidentiary hearing and a petition for post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion, the 'overall question of whether Dikken’s ’guilty plea was valid presents a question of law that we review de novo

A postconviction court abuses its discretion only when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

A postcon-viction court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” ().

A postconviction court abuses its discretion only when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” ().

A postconviction court abuses its discretion only when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” ().