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To determine whether a plea is supported by “an adequate factual basis, we examine whether there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” d 149, 154 (Minn. 2014) (citation modified).

“We may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.”

To determine whether a guilty plea has an adequate factual basis, “we examine whether there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that [the] defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” (quotation omitted).

A court “may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.” (citation omitted).

Lussier v. State , see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

To determine whether a guilty plea has an adequate factual basis, “we examine whether there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” (quotation omitted).

4(a); Riley, d at 170-71.

“We may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.”

Courts “may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.” 154 (Minn. 2014).

The two prongs of the Strickland test are (1) appellant’s post conviction counsel’s representation “fell below an objective stand ard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Lussier v. State

Courts “may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.” Lussier v. State

On appeal from a postconviction court’s denial of relief, “we address questions of law de novo, review the postconviction court’s factual findings for clear error, and evaluate the postconviction court’s ultimate decision to deny relief for an abuse of discretion.” Lussier v. State

See Black v. State , , 85 (Minn. 1997) ; see also Lussier v. State , , 152 (Minn. 2014).

d 149, 154 (Minn. 2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)) .

Min nesota courts “have extended the Knaffla rule to claims that were, or should have been, raised in a previous postconviction petition.”

4 Minnesota courts “have extended the Knaffla rule to claims that were, or should have been, raised in a previous postconviction petition.”

However, appellate courts “review the postconviction court’s factual findings for clear error, and evaluate the postconviction court’s ultimate decision to deny relief for an abuse of discretion.”

However, appellate courts “review the postconviction court’s factual findings for clear error, and evaluate the postconviction court’s ultimate decision to deny relief for an abuse of discretion.”

(citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 66 8, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 2064, 2068 7 (1984)).

“When determining whether a guilty plea has an adequate factual basis, [appellate courts] examine whether there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” d 149, 154 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted) (Lussier II).

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

“A[n] evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the petitioner fails to allege facts that are sufficient to entitle him or her to the relief requested.” (quotation omitted).

An appellate court “may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.”

d 743, 746 (Minn. 2003) (extending rule of Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, d at 741, to subsequent postconviction petitions).

“When determining whether a guilty plea has an adequate factual basis, [appellate courts] examine whether there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” (Lussier II) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).

(extending rule of State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, to subsequent postconviction petitions).

1; see State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 3 (stating that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”); (stating that Knaffla’s procedural bar has been “extended .

“To prevail under Strickland, [a petitioner] must show that (1) his postconviction counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotations omitted).