Cited by

See Lawrence, d at 253 ( comparing “receiving,” which “connotes a single act,” with possession and concealment, which are ongoing); State v. Fleming , (stating that possession offense continued during assault).

(stating that the district court properly considered a “grant of a downward dispositional departure when deciding whether to revoke probation”), aff’d

Guidelines 3.B (2012) (stating that the district court may give “[l]ess judicial tolerance” for offenders convicted of more severe offenses)) (other citation omitted), aff’d

aff’d, d 790 (Minn. 2016) .

(stating that, in deciding whether to revoke probation, a district court may consider the fact that the defendant received a downward dispositional departure), aff’d

5a(b) (2016); (holding an upward durational departure is appropriate when an offender’s conduct is “significantly more serious than typically involved in the commission of the sentenced offense”) (citing Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd.

on the fact that the present offense of conviction involved an aggravating factor that would justify a durational departure.” “[A]n aggravating factor is conduct that renders the sentenced offense significantly more serious than typically involved in the commission of the sentenced offense.”

aff’d on other grounds , .

Because Crenshaw does not argue that the sentence is unlawful for this reason, we need not address respondent’s

xplaining that when considering whether to revoke a stayed sentence, “[l]ess judicial tolerance is urged for offenders who were convicted of a more severe offense”); (explaining that in deciding whether to revoke probation, district court’s grant of a downward dispositional departure was a proper consideration) , aff’d on other grounds , d 790 (Minn. 2016).

State v. Fleming , n.1 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d

( “We have previously said that ‘[t]he word ‘notwithstanding’ is the equivalent of the words ‘in spite of.’’”) (quoting Governmental Research Bureau, Inc. v. Borgen , ).

That was a proper consideration.”), aff’d, (Minn. Aug.

2015) (affirming probation revocation on third Austin factor based on offender’s being found with “58 grams of marijuana,” “near exhaustion of relevant programming opportunities,” and the determination that continued probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation when offender flau nted the law by standing across the street from a park with drugs in his backpack), aff’d, State v. Hemmings , (affirming probation revocation when the offender refused to comply with a treatment p

That was a proper consideration.”), aff’d

See State v. Jones , (stating that conduct underlying one conviction cannot be relied on to su pport upward departure for separate conviction); but see State v. Fleming , (concluding that, under Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd.

That was a proper consideration.”), aff’d

ating factor arising from the same course of conduct.” In interpreting this statute, the supreme court stated that a dist rict court may “consider the entirety of a defendant’s conduct in determining whether the defendant committed the sentenced offense in a manner that is significantly more serious than that typically involved in the commission of the sentenced offense.” State v. Fleming

(upholding a probation revocation where the district court found that the defendant “was not amenable to probation” in reference to the third Austin factor) SM 2.11(C.) aff'd

“[A] court must impose the presumptive sentence—that is, a sentence w ithin the applicable disposition and range— ‘unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a 11 departure.’” State v. Fleming , (quoting Minn. Sent.

When interpreting a statute, we give words and phrases them plain and ordinary meaning, and “read the statute as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions.” Conga Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue

Appellate courts “review a district court’ s departure from a presumptive sentence for an abuse of di scretion.”

“[A] court must impose the presumptive sentence—that is, a sentence within the applicable disposition and range—‘unless th ere exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.’” (quoting Minn. Sent.

aff’d on other grounds, review denied (Minn. Feb.