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And “[w]e may not base our decision on matters that were not received into evidence by the district court and that are outside the record on appeal.” (citing Thiele, d at 582-83).

In doing so, we first determine “whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”

(“We may not base our decision on matters that were not received into evidence by the district court and that are outside the record on appeal.”).

App. P. 110.01 (stating that the appellate record consists of “[t]he documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings”); -83 (Minn. 1988) (holding that we generally do not consider matters not produced and received in the district court.); see In re Welfare of Child of J.P.– S., (applying this aspect of Thiele in a child-protection- related appeal).

18, 1987); (quoting this aspect of Tereault) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”) .

When “a statute is unambiguous , our role is to enforce the language of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.” (quotation omitted).

871 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted).

“The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” In re Welfare of J.P.–S., (quotation omitted).

(“We may not base our decision on matters that were not received into evidence by the district court and that are outside the record on appeal.”).

14, 2000); (declining to require district courts to consider parents’ finances when making out-of-home placement decisions because as an error-correcting court we “cannot impose such a burden on the district court in the absence of authority mandating such consideration”).