Cited by

(quotation omitted), and “depends on the facts and circumstances of [a] particular case.” ().

(concluding that although an exception to section 609.035 applied, the sentence imposed unfairly exaggerated the criminality of appellant’s behavior).

Saari analogizes his case to State v. Longo, where we held that racketeering and controlled- substance offenses were part of a single be havioral incident because the defendant’s controlled-substance offenses were a mean s toward “facilitating and sustaining” his 7 racketeering “enterprise.”

In determining misconduct’s effect on the defendant’s substantial rights, we consider “(1) the strength of the state’s evidence; (2) the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.” (quotation omitted).

Burrell also cites State v. Longo, in which the enterprise had “a clear organizational structure, with [the defendant] as the principal” and another individual as his “right-hand man.” d 599, 606 (Minn. App. 2018).

See, (characterizing an association having a principal operating with a “right-hand man” and other drug runners as a “clear organizational structure”).

12 Here, the district court used the Hernandez method to sentence Wang Navas for the sex-trafficking offense.

Legal issues raised in an appellate brief are forfeited when the “brief contains no citation to legal authority to support his allegations.”

(stating that “the defense had an opportunity to rehabilitate the appellant on re-direct and to respond to the remarks in closing argument, clearly lessening the possibility that the remarks contributed to the verdict”); (noting that “Longo had the opportunity to rebut the misconduct in his closing argument but did not”).

In reviewing whether plain error affected substantial rights, this court considers “(1) the strength of the state’s evidence; (2) the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.” (quotation omitted).

If we were to consider this issue, we would reject Sanchez-Sanchez’s argument that the postconviction court erred by not vacating his sentence under the DSRA.3 d 501, 502, 504 (Minn. 2017) (vacating and remanding for resentencing under the DSRA when defendant received bottom -of-the-box sentence); (reversing and remanding for resentencing under the DSRA because DSRA reduced the preemptive sentence applicable to defendant who received sentence within presumptive range).

See State v. Longo , -04 (Minn. App. 2018); see also State v. Hernandez , d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981) (permitting district court to apply increased criminal -history score for the last of several serial convictions that were not part of “a single behavioral incident or course of conduct”).

See State v. Longo , (“When an offense is committed with the intent of fac ilitating another offense or is but a means toward committing another offense, the offenses are part of the same behavioral incident.”).

d 599, 607 (Minn. App. 2018) (explaining that accomplice testimony requires corroboration because it is “inherently suspect”).