Cited by

“A district court has subject- matter jurisdiction to convict a defendant of all crimes cognizable under the laws of the State of Minnesota.” d 674, 680 (Minn. 2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.025 (2020) (“A person may be convicted and sentenced under the law of this state if the person .

Whether a rule of law “applies retroactively to convictions that were final when the rule was announced is a legal question that [appellate courts] review de novo.” d 674, 681 (Minn. 2018).

-97 (Minn. 2019) (explaining the legislative change that now requires blood and urine samples be obtained only pursuant to a search warrant); (holding that the warrant requirement is a substantive change to the law for the purpose of retroactive application).

Whether a rule of law “applies retroactively to convictions that were final when the rule was announced is a legal question that [appellate courts] review de novo.”

In support of this argument, he cites Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016)

In November 2018, Harbison filed a

Corrigan argues that, when the legislature amended the stalking statute in 2020, it effectively repealed the statute, and that the 2018 somehow provides authority for the proposition that this “repeal” should be applied retroactively.

petitioned for postconviction relief, asking the district court to vacate his 2012 conviction based on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), which together articulated the Birchfield rule.1 Cibulka contended the Birchfield rule applied retroactively to his conviction under Johnson I

(Johnson I), which held the Birchfield rule applied retroactively to postconviction review of test-refusal convictions.

Fulks argued that the state lacked a warrant to obtain his blood or urine and no exception to the warrant requirement applied, (Johnson I).2 The state opposed his petition and argued that exigent circumstances excused the warrant requirement.

First, (Johnson I), the supreme court held that the rule announced in Birchfield applied retroactively.

n.2, 679 (Minn. 2018) ( Johnson I ).

Johnson v. State (Johnson I), n.2 (Minn. 2018) ; see also Johnson v. State (Johnson II), (“[T] he Birchfield rule says that test refusal by a suspected impaired driver may be criminalized consistent with the Fourth Amendment only when there is a warrant for the test or a warrant exception applies.”).

On rema nd from a prior decisi on by this court, see Johnson v. State (Johnson I) , the district court determined that Johnson was entitled to postconviction relief regardless of whether McNeely applied.

In those cases, the supreme court held that in the driving-while-impaired context, “the [s]tate may not criminalize refusal of a blood or a urine test absent a search warrant or a showing that a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies.” (discussing Trahan and Thompson).

For support, Heard cites Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), Johnson v. State , and Fagin v. State , .2 Those cases regard the unconstitutional application of Minnesota’s chemical -test-refusal statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd.

See Reed, d at 731 (explaining that challenges to subject -matter jurisdiction “relate to ‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case ’ ” (quoting United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002))); (“ A district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to convict a defendant of all crimes cognizable under the laws of the State of Minnesota.

On a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. ch. 590 (2018) asserting the invalidity of a test-refusal conviction under Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), 2 the petitioner bears the burden to allege and prove there was neither a warrant nor an applicable exception to the warrant requirement.

at 2186-87; (explaining that under Birchfield, individuals may be convicted of the crime of test refusal for refusing to submit to a breath test, but may only be convicted for refusing a blood or urine test if the police have a search warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies).

Moreover, “a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of conduct that is not criminal.”

Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court described the Birchfield rule as meaning, “in the DWI context, the State may not criminalize refusal of a blood or a urine test absent a search warrant or a showing that a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies.” see also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016) (concluding that a similar implied-consent advisory given in 2013 was inaccurate in light of the United States Supreme Court’s determination that blood tests could not be

In light of the supreme court’s recent opinion in Johnson v. State , we reverse and remand for further proceedings.