Cited by

To assess the sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the evidence to determine ‘whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.’” ().

12 Neumann, –33 (Minn. 1978), (factual basis established by testimony from partial trial); Lussier, d at 589 (factual basis established by grand jury transcript).

“While proof of a motive is not a necessary element of premeditated murder, presence of a motive strengthens a finding that defendant deliberated over his actions and weakens the argument that the killing was spontaneous.”

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine “whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.”

reviewing the sufficiency of direct evidence, we ask “whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them” allow the jury, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden of proof, “to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting State v. Moore , ).

Wilson argues that, (“ Moore III”), we must reverse both convictions because both verdicts are invalid.

According to Goodloe, CRIMJIG 11.02 that “some appreciable time” must pass after forming an intent to kill.

To show premeditation, “the state must alw ays prove that, after the def endant formed the intent to kill, some appreciable time passe d during which the considerati on, planning, preparation or determination required by Minn. Stat. § 609.18 prior to the commission of the act took place.”

State v. Palmer , , 734 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Moore , , 361 (Minn. 1992) ).

(noting that the jury is in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Moore , , 361 (Minn. 1992) (same).

And, as the district court instructed the jury here, “[p]remeditation, by definition, requires some amount of time to pass between formation of the intent and the carrying out of the act.” (emphasis added); (explaining that premeditation requires the State to “prove that before the commission of the act- but after the defendant formed the intent to kill some appreciable time passed during which the defendant considered, planne

(affirming the denial of a motion to change venue where the 1-year-old news coverage was factual in content and the parties had an opportunity to question potential jurors about any exposure to publicity during voir dire), the State argued that a fair trial was possible because more than a year had p

Absent evidence to the contrary, however, we must presume that a lawyer resolves those conflicts in favor of the client.”

(concluding that 11 months between the publication of pretrial publicity and the start of trial mitigated any prejudicial effects of 119 articles about the crime); (holding that district court acted within its discretion in denying change-of-venue request where all but one of the news articles were 3 published over a year before the trial).

(“It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the [district court] must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.”), d 661, 665 (Minn. App. 1999) (concluding that a manifest injustice did not exist where the defendant’s testimony was “sufficient to infer [his] guilt”), review denied (Minn. Aug.

In order for there to be an adequate factual basis for a plea, there need be only sufficient facts from which the defendant’s guilt can be “reasonably inferred.” d 426, 430 (Minn. 1978)

Nelson argues that the appropriate standard is “whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” () (internal quotation marks omitted).

A finding of premeditation requires that the defendant had “some appreciable time,” after forming the intent to kill, “to ‘consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit’ the killing.” Palmer, d at 734 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.18; ).

• The State should have said, “It- is not necessary that premeditation exist for any specific length of time.” *325 -61 (Minn.1992) (“Premeditation, by definition, requires some amount of time to pass between -formation of the intent and the carrying out of the act.”).

and testimony of the victims introduced at earlier hearings,” “[t]he state’s evidence, as summarized by the prosecutor” at the plea hearing, 686 (Minn. 1979); evidence introduced during partial trial, – 33 (Minn. 1978), and a detective’s sworn complaint, a presentence-investigation report (PSI), and the defendant’s Department of Corrections file, State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 326–27 & n.9, & n.9 (1976).

Ortega, d at 100; Palmer, d at 733

(“It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the [district court] must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.”), (concluding that a manifest injustice did not exist where the defendant’s testimony was “sufficient to infer [his] guilt”).